Beginning of October 1986. Reports about the latest labor exploits of the Soviet people continued to pour in from television screens and newspaper pages. Although, against the usual background, media reports about the accident of a Soviet submarine went virtually unnoticed - it took up only three lines in the newspapers - this was the first time. For the first time we were openly told that our warship was in distress off the coast of America. And the fact that M.S. Gorbachev, at a meeting in Reykjavik, notified US President R. Reagan about this incident, made us think about the seriousness of the incident and its possible consequences for those of us for whom the words and phrases “combat patrol,” “thermonuclear warhead,” “megaton,” “TNT equivalent” sounded like nothing more than obscure professionalisms.

More than a dozen years have passed since then. The media have repeatedly tried to highlight the causes of the death of K-219, but newspaper publications were unable to fully reflect the nature of the damage to the submarine and the heroic efforts of the crew to save it. We bring to your attention an article by the Chairman of the St. Petersburg Club of Submariners, Captain 1st Rank Reserve Igor Kirillovich Kurdin, who for a long time served as senior assistant to the commander of the strategic missile submarine cruiser (RPK SN) K-219 of Project 667-AU.

The Motherland said “we must”

In accordance with the plan, on September 4, 1986, the RPK SN K-219 went to sea for combat service. The submarine commander, Captain 2nd Rank Igor Anatolyevich Britanov, was an experienced submariner who received permission to independently control the RPK SN project 667-AU in 1981. However, on this campaign, which was his third as a commander and thirteenth in his officer service, he did not command his own ship - the watch aboard K-219 was carried by the first crew of K-241, which included 31 officers, 38 midshipmen and 49 sailors and staffed by highly qualified specialists. But this time the preparations for the campaign were more chaotic than ever.

The Cold War continued, our Navy (like the Strategic Missile Forces) bore the brunt of the nuclear missile confrontation between the two superpowers. The Soviet Union's response to the deployment of American Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe primarily included building up the combat service forces of the USSR Navy and bringing the PKK SN combat patrol areas directly to the US coast. This was done in order to equalize the flight time of missiles to the main targets on American territory with the flight time of American missiles aimed at our military and civilian targets.

The intensity of the combat use of the RPK SN has increased to two or three combat campaigns per year. The service life of the equipment had reached the limit of its capabilities, and the repair base was far from meeting the tasks that the fleet was solving. The submariners themselves were in an even more difficult situation: two or three combat tours a year, unused vacations, and personnel confusion became the norm. Under the pressure of circumstances, the command was forced to turn a blind eye to the fact that the crews went to sea not on their “native”, mastered ships. There could be no question of crew agility.

An analysis of the list of personnel who entered combat service on the K-219 shows that in preparation for the departure of 31 full-time officers to the RPK SN, 11 were replaced, including the key ones - senior assistant commander, assistant commander, missile commanders (warhead -2) and torpedo (BC-3) combat units, head of the radio technical service (RTS). A similar situation arose with the foremen: out of 38 midshipmen, 16 were replaced, including both foremen of the BC-2 teams. But I cannot raise my hand to blame the then chief of staff of the 19th division of the RPK SN, responsible for manning the crews, now Rear Admiral N.N. Malov, since it was during that period that the division, by order from above, brought five strategic missile submarines into combat service.

Why didn’t the commander refuse to go to sea on an unprepared, “alien” ship with a partially unfamiliar crew? Yes, because if Britanov had refused, someone else would have been immediately put in his place with the corresponding conclusions for himself. But let's return to the events of October 3, 1986.

Explosion in a missile silo

It was the thirtieth day of the campaign, K-219 was maneuvering in the designated area of the Sargasso Sea. At 4.56 on October 3, the submarine surfaced to periscope depth for the next communication session, and five minutes later began diving to a depth of 85 m. The state of the technical equipment at that moment was as follows: the power plant operated in a single-echelon version, the power of the starboard reactor was 30%; the port side reactor was plugged with all absorbers, the steam generating unit (SPU) and the turbine were ready for commissioning; the starboard turbine was powered by a propeller, the left side shafting was ready to operate from the propeller electric motor.

At 5.14, the commander of the missile warhead and the bilge operator of the IV (missile) compartment discovered a drip leak from under the plug of missile silo No. 6. When the plug was pressed, water began to stream out. After the report of the commander of BC-2 about the appearance of water in shaft No. 6 (the third shaft from the bow on the port side), on the orders of the ship’s commander, the ascent to a safe depth (46 m) began at 5.25. A pump was started to drain shaft No. 6. At 5.32, brown oxidizer vapors began to flow from under the plug of missile silo No. 6 into compartment IV. The commander of the warhead-2 announced an emergency alarm in the compartment and reported this to the command post.

The personnel of other compartments left the IV compartment. Nine people remained in the emergency compartment. The ship's commander announced an emergency alert. A minute later, the ship’s crew was already carrying out primary measures to combat survivability, including sealing the compartments. By this time the boat had surfaced to a safe depth. Five minutes later (at 5.38) an explosion occurred in shaft No. 6.

Black smoke appeared in compartment IV, then water with rocket fuel components began flowing into the compartment from the destroyed pipelines located in the upper part of the shaft. The commander immediately gave the command for an emergency ascent to the surface. Based on the results of the inspection of the compartments, the following consequences of the accident were established: in compartment IV there was severe gas contamination, in the hold of the compartment there was water (about 4.5 tons); control over the state of the missiles in the remaining silos was temporarily lost; individual devices failed: the ship's public address system (“Kashtan”), as well as the “Kashtan” missile warhead systems in compartments IV and V; The R-651 radio transmitter partially failed, individual lights and lamps in the compartments were broken, and the high-pressure air pipeline in the superstructure was damaged. On the control panel of the power plant, an alarm was triggered about the loss of power from the 220 V DC network on the left side, the opening of automatic feed water supply valves to all steam generators on the left side, and the opening of individual valves of the 3rd circuit. On the control panel of the Kama electrical power system, an alarm sounded indicating that the insulation resistance of the electrical networks on both sides had dropped to zero. At the command of the Civil Command Command, defense lines were created in III (compartment of the central post) and V (missile) compartments, and air pressure was created in these same compartments.

At 6.10, the personnel of the V and VI (auxiliary mechanisms compartment) compartments were transferred to the VIII (turbine) compartment. Seven minutes later, a report was received from compartment IV that it was impossible to stay in the compartment due to high gas contamination and high temperature. By order of the submarine commander, compartment V was prepared to receive the personnel of the IV. At 6.35, the personnel from the IV compartment were withdrawn, but three people remained in it, including the commander of the warhead-2. By order of the commander of the electromechanical combat unit (WCU-5), the port side electronic control unit began to be put into operation.

After the withdrawal of personnel at 6.45, an emergency party of two people was sent to compartment IV to assess the situation and provide assistance to the people remaining in the compartment. But due to the heavy smoke in the compartment, the commander of the BC-2 could not be found, and it was not possible to inspect shaft No. 6 in detail. The bodies of sailors I.K. Kharchenko and N.L. Smaglyuk were taken out of the compartment. The scouts did not make any switches of power consumers, and they did not find any fires.

At 7.25, ventilation of compartments IV, V and VI into the atmosphere began. At dawn, the senior assistant submarine commander inspected the emergency shaft No. 6 from the roof of the wheelhouse fence. The silo cover was missing, the missile head was not visible, the cover shaft was turned to the side, the light hull structures in the silo area were damaged, the fairings of the caps of silos No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 were torn off and hanging on the sides, the missile deck was in the emergency area the mine is deformed. Brown smoke was faintly coming from shaft No. 6.

At 8.51, two people from the emergency party were again sent to compartment IV. The gas pollution in the compartment has decreased and visibility has improved. No water entered the compartment from the upper part of shaft No. 6. The scouts discovered the commander of the warhead-2, captain 3rd rank A.V. Petrachkova without signs of life.

By that time, it was possible to prepare a system for pumping shaft No. 6 with sea water and drain the hold of compartment IV through the main drainage line. After the pump was started to pump the shaft, water and thick brown smoke began to flow into the compartment from the damaged pipelines in the upper part of the shaft. By order of the GKP, the pump was stopped. The body of the warhead-2 commander, gas analysis instruments and artificial satellites were taken out of the compartment.

At 9.25 the left side power plant was put into operation. PPUs of both sides were in operation, the power level was: starboard - 30%, left - 50%.

The submarine commander decided to urgently drain the oxidizer and pump the mine. For this purpose, he instructed and sent four more groups from BC-2 and BC-5 to compartment IV. All attempts to start pumping the shaft resulted in additional oxidizer vapor and water entering the compartment. The last group started the emergency oxidizer drain pump. Water under pressure began to flood electrical equipment, including distribution boards in the compartment. Short circuits occurred in the shields, which resulted in a fire in compartment IV. The fire cut off power to the compartment's electrical equipment and the pumps stopped. By order of the Civil Command, the last emergency batch left compartment IV.

At 5:54 p.m., by decision of the Civil Control Committee, freon was supplied to compartment IV from the volumetric chemical extinguishing station (VOC) of compartment III, while part of the freon began to flow into compartment III through a leak in the freon supply pipeline, and therefore the supply of fire extinguisher to compartment IV was stopped. At approximately 18.00, the situation regarding the gas composition of the air in compartment III worsened, the content of nitrogen oxides exceeded the permissible standards by 10-40 times. The personnel, by order of the submarine commander, joined the satellite. Some people moved to compartment II. The personnel were forced to leave the communications post and encryption post, as a result, radio communications stopped (the next report on the situation on the submarine was not transmitted and the radiogram from the Northern Fleet commander with recommendations on the fight for survivability was not accepted).

At 18.40, to inspect the V compartment, the bulkhead door between the IV and V compartments was opened, in the latter they found a lot of smoke, which was mistakenly taken for a fire and was reported to the command post. In compartment V, by order of the GKP, freon was given from the LOX station of compartment VI.

At 19.30, due to the loss of power in the 380 V 50 Hz network on the starboard side, the emergency protection of the starboard reactor was activated. At the same time, the compensating grids of the reactor did not lower to the lower “limit switches” (limit switches).

Twenty minutes later, the control center from the VII compartment (reactor) reported that smoke was entering the lower room of the VI compartment. The compartment was abandoned, the bulkhead flaps between compartments V and VI did not close, people moved to compartment VIII. It was soon discovered that the pressure in the ship's hydraulic system had dropped to zero. In order to ensure the nuclear safety of the starboard reactor, BC-5 specialists - senior lieutenant N.N. Belikov and sailor S.A. Preminin - were sent three times to manually lower the compensating grids into the VII compartment. After senior lieutenant N.N. Belikov lost consciousness, the work of lowering the compensating gratings was carried out by one sailor Preminin. At the same time, at the command of the GKP, the VIII, IX (turbine) and X (end) compartments were ventilated into the atmosphere, the pressure in them decreased to atmospheric pressure, and in the VII compartment, relative to VIII, it remained elevated. Because of this, at the end of the work, the personnel of the VIII compartment were unable to open the bulkhead door between the VII and VIII compartments. An attempt to equalize the pressure in the evacuation system of the lower room of the VIII compartment was stopped by brown smoke emerging from the pipeline. In order to reduce the pressure in compartment VII, sailor S.A. Preminin from the main command post was given the command to try to open the shutter of the compartment ventilation system, but he was no longer able to do this. The emergency team from the other compartment could not do this either. Subsequently, sailor S.A. Preminin no longer answered the questions of the Civil Command.



Photos of a K-219 in distress taken from a US Navy aircraft

At 21.30, the MMF vessels “Fedor Bredikhin”, “Krasnogvardeysk” and “Bakaritsa” began approaching the area of the accident. By 23.00 (according to personnel reports), the gas composition in the compartments had deteriorated, the satellites had exhausted their service life, and the temperature of the bulkhead between compartments III and IV was increasing. Based on the reports received, the submarine commander, when assessing the condition of the ship, assumed that a fire was ongoing in compartments IV, V and VI, compartment VII was under pressure, and a fire could not be ruled out in compartments VIII, IX and X. Considering that the satellite's resource had been exhausted and that the missiles could explode due to a fire in compartments IV and V, the ship's commander decided to deactivate the left borg reactor and prepare for the evacuation of the submarine personnel to the MMF vessels.

The emergency protection of the left side reactor was reset, and the installation was switched to cooldown mode. The evacuation of personnel began, which ended at one in the morning on October 4. After the evacuation of the personnel, the bow, wheelhouse and stern hatches were closed and battened down. Six officers remained on the bridge, led by the ship's commander.

At 1.46 a.m., a message from the commander of K-219 was received at the Navy Central Command Control Center through the MMF command post: “Fire in all compartments, no progress. There are 6 people left on the submarine. A strong fire in the holds of compartments IV and V. The commander is awaiting orders to abandon ship." At 3.00, by order of the commander of the Northern Fleet, the remaining officers, with the exception of the commander, left the ship.

At 22.45, an emergency party under the leadership of the senior assistant commander of the submarine landed on the boat, which inspected the I, II and III compartments of the ship. These compartments were dry, the pressure in them was normal, and the emergency lighting was on. At the same time, the batteries were partially discharged, the pressure in the high-pressure air system dropped by half, and there was no hydraulic system. The submarine's durable hull above compartments IV and VII was heated, possibly by residual heat in the reactor. The robust housing in the area of the other compartments had the outside air temperature. The bulkhead between compartments III and IV remained cold to the level of the upper edge of the bulkhead door, and warm above.

When visiting the bow compartments, the emergency party leveled the trim by blowing through the bow main ballast tanks (CBTs) and began preparing the submarine for towing. It was not possible to conduct reconnaissance of the aft compartments - the aft hatch was flooded. With the onset of darkness, preparations for towing were suspended, and the emergency party left the submarine.

The death of the ship

At dawn on October 5, the emergency party continued preparing the ship for towing. At 18.15 the motor ship "Krasnogvardeysk" began towing. The submarine's draft and bow trim continued to slowly increase. At 6.20 on October 6, the towing cable broke, the bow and stern entrance hatches went under water. Due to the jamming of the lower conning hatch, the emergency party was unable to descend into compartment III. The submarine continued to lose buoyancy, and when it sank to the level of the superstructure deck, the emergency party abandoned the ship. At 11.00, when the submarine sank into the water to the level of the wheelhouse rudders, by order of the Navy Civil Code, the commander left the ship. At 11.02 on October 6, 1986, K-219 sank.

Investigation

A criminal case was opened into the death of K-219, the investigation into which lasted almost a year. The culprits, as always, were those who tried to save people and the ship. The ship's commander, political officer and commander of the warhead-5 were dismissed due to official inconsistency, and the crew was disbanded. Of the entire crew, only sailor S.A. Preminin was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously). * [By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 844 of August 7, 1997, S.A. Preminin was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Russian Federation]

It is necessary to pay tribute to the heroism of the submarine crew, who ensured normal radiation conditions during the accident. The state of the reactor cores and their controls at the time of the ship's sinking excluded the possibility of nuclear and thermal explosions. The main command and control team and the ship's personnel correctly organized and carried out the initial measures to combat survivability. The ship surfaced. All compartments were sealed, and back pressure was created in III and V. The left side power plant was put into operation, a compartment-by-compartment inspection was carried out, and faults that arose in the missile silo were identified. Some of them were eliminated. The reconnaissance carried out made it possible to assess the situation in compartment IV and ventilate compartments IV, V and VI. As a result of the measures taken, the situation on the ship was temporarily stabilized. Both power plants operated at a given power, the refrigeration machines were operating, the ship had power supply and was moving at a speed of 13 knots to the meeting point with the MMF ships. At the same time, the submarine command did not take all measures to prevent further development of the accident and the death of the ship.

As a result of the investigation conducted by the special commission, it was established:

1. The cause of the accident with the rocket in shaft No. 6 was the flooding of the shaft with water. This led to the destruction of the rocket body and leakage of propellant components into the silo. The reason for the ignition and burning of rocket fuel components in the shaft, which led to an increase in pressure and its rupture (tearing off the cover and depressurization of the irrigation pipelines), was the lack of irrigation of the shaft and the failure to remove the shaft cover ratchet (in the surface position of the submarine).

It was not possible to definitively determine the cause of water entering the mine. A possible reason could be a leak in the shaft cover due to mechanical damage during the submarine's combat service.

2. The reason for the spread of nitrogen oxides from compartment IV and the gas contamination of the aft compartments was multiple visits to compartment IV by emergency teams for reconnaissance, assistance, ventilation, pumping the mines with water and emergency drainage of the oxidizer. Starting the pumps and pumping the shaft led to an additional release of nitrogen oxides from the leaking shaft into the compartment. This also caused a short circuit in switchboards No. 7 and No. 8 and a fire in the compartment.

3. The cause of the death of K-219 was the uncontrolled flow of sea water into compartment IV, which led to the loss of longitudinal stability and buoyancy of the submarine. The reason for the flooding of compartment IV was the connection to the outboard space of shaft No. 6, which was not sealed relative to the compartment, through the outboard valves left open. The filling of compartments V and VI occurred from compartment IV through unclosed ventilation flaps between IV and V, V and VI compartments.

The situation with the replacement of the K-219 crew, which led to tragic consequences, was not unique in the Soviet Navy. The test firing of the submarine of the 2nd flotilla K-429 on June 23, 1983 cost the lives of 16 members of the crew and ended in the death of the ship. Instead of 87 crew members on staff, there were 120 people on board the K-429, only 43 of them were full-time. The rest were collected from five submarine crews.

NATO classification "Yankee" Speed (surface) 15 knots Speed (underwater) 28 knots Working depth 320 m Maximum immersion depth 450 m Sailing autonomy 90 days Crew 119 people: 32 officers, 38 midshipmen, 49 sailors, Dimensions Surface displacement 7,760 t Displacement underwater 11,500 t Maximum length (according to KVL) 128 m Body width max. 11.7 m Average draft (according to waterline) 7.9 m Power point 2 pressurized water reactors VM-2-4
2 steam turbine units OK-700
2 turbo gear units TZA-635
2 turbo generators Armament Torpedo-
mine weapons TA 4 x 533 mm (16 torpedoes, 2 of them with nuclear charges), 2 x 400 mm (4 torpedoes). Missile weapons D-5 missile system, 16 R-27 (RSM-25) SLBM launchers Images on Wikimedia Commons

Specifications

At the beginning of its service, it was armed with 16 single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missiles of the RSM-25 type, each capable of carrying two nuclear warheads with a firing range of up to 2,000 km. In 1975, launchers D-5 have been upgraded to D-5U, which made it possible to establish K-219 upgraded missiles RSM-25U with a launch range of up to 3,000 km with three warheads. For self-defense, the cruiser had 6 torpedo tubes.

Accidents on board (before the last trip to sea)

During service on board K-219 There were numerous difficulties associated with both nuclear missile launchers and missile silo covers.

From the materials of the commission to investigate the causes of death K-219:

In preparation for going to sea on the K-219, 12 officers out of 32 were replaced, including the senior assistant and assistant commander, commanders of the missile and mine-torpedo combat units, the head of the radio engineering service, the ship's doctor, the commander of the electrical division, 4 compartment commanders . Of the 38 midshipmen, 12 were replaced, including both foremen of the missile warhead-2 teams

K-219 missile silo damaged by explosion

Water entered through a hole on the missile deck, approximately in the middle of the cruiser’s hull, as a result of which the ship instantly “fell” to a depth of about 300 meters, which was almost the maximum allowable diving depth. At the time of the explosion, the cruiser was drifting and the rudders were in a neutral position. When the boat “sank” to a depth of 350 meters, commander Britanov decides to blow out all the tanks to get rid of ballast water. At the same time, the propellers were launched to perform an emergency ascent mode, when the boat tends to the surface of the water along a steep trajectory. Two minutes after the explosion K-219 jumped to the surface of the water.

The crew left the half-flooded, gas-filled fourth (missile) compartment and battened down the sealed bulkheads. There was a significant difference from 1973. The problem was that the resulting nitric acid did not have time to corrode the rubber seals of the partitions to the bow and stern of the cruiser. Due to the toxic gases, the boat was actually divided into two independent halves: the command and torpedo compartments in the bow were isolated by the missile compartment from the medical, reactor, control and turbine compartments in the stern.

Risk of reactor destruction

Sailor Sergei Preminin

The crew in both the bow and stern compartments put on their breathing apparatus and tried to move to a safe distance from the explosion site. Soon the thermometer of a nuclear reactor cooling system VM-4 showed a sharp increase in the temperature of the coolant of the reactor primary circuit. Everything indicated that a meltdown of the reactor core was possible. In addition, an attempt to shut down the reactor from the control panel yielded nothing: gas heated to a high temperature could rupture the control pipes of the emergency control cassette (compensating grid) or the high temperature would damage the compensation grid control mechanism. In this case, it is only possible to manually shut down the reactor, for which crew members must enter the reactor compartment and manipulate directly with the reactor. This also means that they will receive a significant dose of radioactive radiation. The radioactive protection suits on board were intended for repair work in the reactor cooling system, but not in the reactor chamber.

Reactor compartment officer Belikov and 20-year-old sailor Sergei Preminin entered the reactor baffle to manually lower the compensating grids. The temperature in the chamber reached 70 °C. Before falling unconscious, Belikov was able to lower three of the four compensating bars. It was hard physical work, because in the inhuman heat the guide bars bent. Twice Preminin entered the cell before he could lower the last, fourth grate. A meltdown of the reactor core was prevented. But neither Preminin nor the sailors were able to open the hatch of the compartment separating the reactor enclosure from the control post, warped from the heat. Preminin died from the heat in the compartment, and the sailors were forced to retreat further aft as the boat continued to fill with toxic orange gas. Preminin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star for preventing a nuclear accident in the Gulf Stream at the cost of his life. In 1997, Preminin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

At the same time K-219 established contact with the Soviet refrigerator "Fyodor Bredikhin" of the Latvian Shipping Company closest to the site of the tragedy. The first to arrive in the area of the accident were Soviet transport ships: the refrigerator "Fedor Bredikhin" of the Latvian Shipping Company, the timber carrier "Bakaritsa" of the Northern Shipping Company, the tanker "Galileo Galilei" of the Novorossiysk Shipping Company, the bulk carrier "Krasnogvardeysk" and the roll-off vessel "Anatoly Vasiliev" of the Baltic Shipping Company (BMP). ). Later, a US Navy tug arrived in the area of the accident. USNS "Powhatan" (T-ATF-166) and submarine USS Augusta (SSN-710). In addition, a P-3C patrol aircraft was constantly in the sky Orion from an American stronghold in Bermuda.

Towing attempt

Soon, the first two vessels of moderate tonnage (the refrigerator "Fedor Bredikhin" of the Latvian Shipping Company and the timber carrier "Bakaritsa" of the Northern Shipping Company) left for their destination ports. By this point, it was obvious to both the command of the US Navy and the command of the USSR Navy that K-219 will have to be towed. The main work on interaction with the K-219 crew was carried out by the crews of “Krasnogvardeysk” and “Anatoly Vasilyev”. The crew of the tanker "Galileo Galilei" protected them. The Americans were actually willing to help, although they had their own plans for the distressed ship and its weapons. And for the Soviet command, this opportunity would be an admission of their helplessness. In the first hours after the arrival of Soviet transport ships, the crew of K-219, with the exception of commander I.A. Britanov and the emergency party, was accepted onto the bulk carrier Krasnogvardeysk and the roll-off vessel Anatoly Vasiliev. From October 3 to October 6, emergency parties of K-219, based on the Krasnogvardeysk and Anatoly Vasilyev, fought fire and water in the compartments of the nuclear submarine. The tug's mission was carried out by the bulk carrier Krasnogvardeysk. To do this, the anchor chain was manually dragged from bow to stern, carried twice around the coaming of the aft hold and connected with a bracket, forming a towing hook. It was secured with two towing ropes, taken to the Krasnogvardeysk from the Anatoly Vasilyev and Galileo Galilei. Our own tow rope was not suitable due to its small diameter and insufficient length.

On October 6, the bulk carrier Krasnogvardeysk was towing K-219 in an easterly direction. At night, for unknown reasons, the towing cable broke and the submarine sank to a depth of more than 5 thousand meters. There are different versions of what happened next. Some sources say that at night USS Augusta (SSN-710) cuts the tug with its wheelhouse, others say that due to damage in the propeller group, water flooded the engine room, increasing the draft of the stern, which ultimately led to the breakage of the tug.

Both the American and Soviet governments made official statements about the incident throughout October 3. Moreover, representatives of the US Navy even convened a press conference at which a map of the accident zone was presented. Both the Soviet and American military departments said that there was no danger of a nuclear explosion or leakage of radioactive substances. On October 4, 1986, a TASS message was broadcast:

On the morning of October 3, a fire occurred in one of the compartments on a Soviet nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles on board in an area approximately 1000 km northeast of Bermuda. The crew of the submarine and the approaching Soviet ships are eliminating the consequences of the fire. There are casualties on board the submarine. Three people died. The commission concluded that there is no danger of unauthorized actions of weapons, a nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination of the environment.

The timing of the accident was very critical. Therefore, both sides tried to refrain from mutual accusations - quite the opposite of how they had previously done as a result of the death K-129 in 1968, and later after the loss "Kursk" in 2000. The reason for this reticence was the preparation for the summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, which took place on October 11 and 12, 1986 in Iceland. The negotiations touched upon the issues of stationary medium-range missiles in Europe.

The US Navy does not usually comment on submarine operations, but in this case, since the allegations are outrageous, we could not help but respond.

The United States Navy categorically denies the accusation that any American submarine collided with a Russian submarine K-219 class Yankee or that the Navy took any action that damaged the Russian Yankee and led to her death.

Consequences

Wreckage K-219 are located at a depth of about 5500 meters. In 1987, the Soviet Institute of the Sea sent a deep-sea vehicle with a camera to the wreckage. Hundreds of photographs were taken, which to this day (as of 2005) are classified as “Top Secret”.

Based on the fact that there were 30 nuclear warheads on board at the time of the disaster, it can be assumed that in total this amounts to about 91 kilograms of highly radioactive materials. It is also known that traces of radioactivity were found at the bottom. It has been documented that traces of plutonium were found on objects recovered from the site of the cruiser's sinking. Presumably they appeared as a result of a rocket explosion.

It is believed that the wreckage of the submarine lies on a sandy bottom. Modeling shows that in this case, plutonium will never reach the ocean surface. At such depths there is practically no movement of water and it is most likely that the spread of radioactivity can be completely eliminated.

The possibility of radiation spreading along the food chain has not been studied.

Publications

In 2006, on the twentieth anniversary of the sinking of the boat, a documentary film “K-219. The Last March", aired on Russian television. The film was nominated for an Emmy Award.

Notes

Literature

In feindlichen Gewässern - Das Ende der K-219. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg 2003. ISBN 3-8132-0688-2
(German) Peter Huchthausen, Igor Kurdin: Hostile Waters. Hutchinson, London 1997, Arrow Books, London 1998 (englische Originalausgabe), ISBN 0-09-180220-2, ISBN 0-09-926966-X
(German) Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew: Jagd unter Wasser. Goldmann, Munich 2000,

I first heard about this submarine, like most of my compatriots, on October 4, 1986 in the evening program Vremya, in which the TASS message was read:

There are casualties on board the submarine. Three people died. The commission came to the conclusion that there is no danger of unauthorized actions of weapons, a nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination of the environment.”

Such a message, until recently, was completely impossible. It became clear to me that the glasnost proclaimed by the 27th Congress was beginning to bear its fruits, which were still modest. What happened, 1000 kilometers from Bermuda, was completely unclear.

At the end of October, a meeting of mechanical engineers was held at the school, under the leadership of the Deputy Civil Command of the Navy, Admiral Novikov. Soon after the meeting, I went to the CEE department and Borya Markitantov, according to the flagship mechanic who took part in the investigation of the disaster, told me the details of the death of the submarine that sank on October 6 in the Sargasso Sea.

This is a submarine built in 1971 under Project 667A and modernized in 1975 under Project 667AU. According to NATO classification "Yankee".
Tactical number K-219, overhauled in 1980.

On September 3, 1986, the K-219 SSBN left its home port of Gadzhievo and headed west to the US coast to carry out patrol duty with 15 nuclear missiles on board. (1)

This was the cruiser's thirteenth combat service. K-219's route ran across the Atlantic Ocean to the east coast of the United States, where the submarine was supposed to conduct combat patrols while awaiting the signal to use weapons. It was planned that this trip would be the last for K-219. After returning, the boat was to be written off. But fate decreed otherwise.

Before going to sea, the K-129 crew was formed hastily. “In preparation for going to sea on the K-219, 12 officers out of 32 were replaced, including the senior assistant and assistant commander, commanders of the missile and mine-torpedo combat units, the head of the radio engineering service, the ship’s doctor, the commander of the electrical division, 4 commanders compartments Of the 38 midshipmen, 12 were replaced, including both foremen of the missile warhead-2 teams" (2)

Even before going to sea, the commander of the BC-2, Alexander Petrachkov, assigned to the campaign, knew about a small leak in the seawater pipeline valve of missile silo No. 6. But he did not take sufficient measures to eliminate the malfunction. Fearing liability for the return of the SSBN (3) to the base for repairs and the disruption of combat service, he did not report the malfunction to the commander, and turned off the alarm for the presence of water in the missile silo.

On September 25, 1986, after turning the valves of the missile silos, by mistake, the irrigation valve along the silo remained not completely closed. Due to a leak in the seawater pipeline valve, seawater first filled the pipeline and then began flowing into shaft number 6 through the irrigation valve, gradually filling it.

On October 3, the nuclear submarine, at a depth of 85 meters, when No. 2 was ready, performed a maneuver to determine whether it was being tracked by an American boat. To do this, she increased her speed to 25 knots, and sailed at this speed for some time. (If there is an American boat on the tail, it will also have to gain the same speed and, at this time, will not hear the noise of the Soviet boat’s propellers.)

Before the end of the maneuver, shaft No. 6 turned out to be completely filled with sea water, and the outboard pressure of 8.5 atmospheres compressed the rocket body.
At 5:30 a.m., rocket crews started pumps to drain the mine. The release of pressure led to a sharp straightening of the compressed rocket body, and the oxidizer tank simply cracked. The aggressive and very toxic liquid instantly penetrated into the mine, forming nitric acid, which destroyed the pipelines of the rocket and the mine.

At 5:32, when the annular gap (3) was drained and the pumps were stopped, the BC-2 watch discovered smoke coming from the missile silo, the first sign that a corrosive oxidizer had entered the silo

The commander of the fourth compartment, Alexander Petrachkov, seeing smoke coming from the mine, declared an emergency alarm and gave the command to everyone not occupied at combat posts to leave the 4th compartment, and the rest to put on insulating gas masks.

A timely given and executed command saved the lives of five dozen people listening to political information in the personnel canteen

Correctly assessing the situation, the commander gave the command to surface to a depth at which it was possible to fill the shaft with water and fire the missile by emergency starting the main engines. But they didn’t have time to do this.

At 5:37, 15 tons of a mixture of oxidizer and rocket fuel in the 6th silo caused a powerful explosion, destroying the rocket and the pressure hull in the area of the rocket deck. From all other mines, emergency signals were received at the central post.

The products of the explosion penetrated into the missile compartment, turning into an extremely toxic fog that was fatal to people.
Two BC-2 sailors, who failed to put on their gas masks, instantly lost consciousness. Alexander Petrachkov managed to put on his gas mask, but he wore a beard, which is why the mask did not fit tightly to his face. He also lost consciousness.

Water entered through a hole in the middle of the submarine's hull. K-219 fell from a depth of 40 to 350 meters. The commander of the warhead-5 reacted instantly and ordered high-pressure air to blow out the ballast tanks. At the same time, the submarine commander increased the speed to perform an emergency ascent.

At 5:39:40. The nuclear submarine K-219 jumped to the surface of the water. The struggle for the survivability of the ship began.
According to readiness number 2, which was before the accident, only one reactor was operating. After an emergency ascent, the commander ordered the second reactor to be started.

The submarine commander ordered the navigator to send a distress signal to fleet headquarters.
7:37 The personnel of Warhead-5 commissioned the second reactor. The situation was improving.

Steam was supplied to the turbine, and the boat could surface under its own power. They reported this to Moscow. The answer was clear: the crew should remain aboard the submarine and wait for help from Soviet cargo ships.

Attempts to ventilate the emergency compartment had no effect.
17:15. Trying to get rid of the remaining rocket fuel in the emergency missile silo, they started the emergency drain pump of the oxidizer from silo No. 6 and turned on the irrigation pump.

This was impossible to do. Since sea water and the remains of explosion products flowed from the damaged pipeline onto the electrical panels
A fire broke out in the fourth compartment. Brown smoke came out of the hold again.

They gave the signal “Emergency!” The pumps were stopped and the fourth compartment was de-energized. But in the 4th compartment the fire flared up more and more.

17:20. The commander of the nuclear submarine, Captain 2nd Rank Britanov, ordered the personnel of the 4th compartment to be evacuated to the 6th compartment, and ordered the head of the medical service, Igor Kochergin, and two of his subordinates to remain in the fifth compartment and receive sailors from the emergency compartment.

In order not to gas the fifth compartment, increased pressure was created in it. Igor Kochergin was wearing a portable breathing device (PRD), which lasts ten minutes. He began to assist the sailors removed from the emergency compartment. The doctor gave them injections directly through their wet clothes, slippery from combustion products and water.

When he saw that one of the victims had run out of remote control and was suffocating, he switched to an insulating gas mask (IP-46) and gave his remote control to the patient.
14 people were rescued from the 4th compartment. Three dead were found - the commander of the warhead-2, Alexander Petrachkov, and the sailors Nikolai Smaglyuk and Igor Kharchenko.

The sealed bulkheads were battened down, but the resulting nitric acid gradually corroded the rubber seals of the bulkheads to the bow and stern of the 4th compartment. The fire extinguishing gas of the LOX system was introduced into the burning compartment.

But the fire spread along the cable routes further into the fifth compartment, visibility in the area deteriorated, and it was incredibly hot. It was very difficult for the doctors to transport the unconscious sailor, a strong man with a considerable weight in wet clothes, slippery from the oxidizer!

But they pulled the victim into the next compartment, where he was given further assistance. At this moment, the resource of the ship's doctor's IP-46 expired. Kochergin worked intensely in it for about 50 minutes, pulling out the victims, performing chest compressions, and making injections.

Feeling that he was suffocating, he motioned for his comrades to give him a spare regenerative cartridge. At the same time, he took off his gas mask to help another victim using mouth-to-mouth breathing.

When switching the IP-46 cartridge, I myself took several breaths of terrible poisonous air. But, having recharged the gas mask, it continued to work.
Due to toxic fumes, the boat was actually divided into two independent halves.

18.50. The emergency protection of the starboard reactor was activated. But the compensating grids did not automatically lower, most likely due to the fact that the cable routes in the fourth compartment were burned out. Due to a power outage, the compensating grids that stop the reactor remained in the up position.

Soon, the thermometer of the cooling system of the VM-4 nuclear reactor showed a sharp increase in the temperature of the distillate of the primary circuit of the reactor, foreshadowing the possibility of a meltdown of the reactor core.

An attempt to shut down the reactor from the control panel failed, and this could only be done manually, resulting in a significant dose of radioactive radiation.

At 20.45, an emergency party consisting of the commander of the reactor compartment, senior lieutenant Nikolai Belikov, and special hold sailor Sergei Preminin is sent to the reactor compartment with the task of manually lowering the compensating grids.

When the temperature in the reactor baffle was more than 70 °C, it was extremely difficult to work in an insulating gas mask. Moreover, the grille guides bent due to the heat. When Belikov, with the help of Perminin, was able to lower three of the four compensating bars, he began to lose consciousness.

Sailor Preminin helped Belikov out of the compartment and continued his unfinished work. He had to enter the reactor baffle twice before he could lower the last, fourth compensating grid. The reactor was completely shut down.

Sergei Preminin reported via intercom to the central post that the reactor had been shut down, but he was unable to escape.
Due to the fire, the pressure in the reactor compartment increased, and neither he himself nor the sailors from the eighth compartment were able, and did not have the right, to open the bulkhead door. Because when trying to equalize the pressure between the compartments, black, toxic smoke came out of the ventilation hole.

As the fire develops, moving from the compartment, the personnel of the aft compartments are evacuated to the 10th compartment.

At 21 o'clock, the first ship of the Ministry of the Navy, "Fedor Bredikhin", approached the K-219, and half an hour later two more Soviet ships. The request of the commander of K-219 was transmitted to the ships to take on board the bodies of three dead and evacuate nine particularly injured, among them the head of the medical service, Lieutenant Kochergin. To ensure evacuation, the boat began to drift

At 23:30, the protection of the port side reactor was reset, and it was shut down by all standard absorbers. The installation is switched to cooling mode.
At 23:35, assessing the extent of the damage, K-219 commander I.A. Britanov, without waiting for instructions from the fleet headquarters, gave the order to evacuate the crew to the ship "Fedor Bredikhin".

The evacuation of personnel ended on October 4 at 02:20. Only the ship's commander, the commander of the warhead-5, the first mate, the assistant and the head of the chemical service remained on the submarine's bridge.

At 03:10, after receiving permission from the commander of the Northern Fleet to evacuate, all officers except the commander left the boat. The commander was left alone on board.

Standing on the bridge, he showed that the ship had not been abandoned by the crew and maintained extraterritoriality.
Moreover, an American tugboat appeared in the area of the accident and a nuclear submarine surfaced.

As the morning approached on October 4, an emergency team from the crew landed on the submarine. The submarine was inspected and it was determined that the fire in the missile compartments was still ongoing.

On October 5, at 13:10, Tu-95 strategic bombers, arriving from Kaliningrad, dropped emergency containers onto the water. But almost all protective IDA-59 had empty cylinders, and VHF radio stations did not have batteries.

The headquarters of the USSR Navy reported that the nuclear submarine K-219 needed to be towed to the base, to its place of permanent deployment.
The nuclear submarine was supposed to be towed by the bulk carrier Krasnogvardeysk, but its towing cable was not suitable due to its small diameter and insufficient length.

Then, the anchor chain was manually dragged from bow to stern, carried twice around the coaming of the aft hold and connected with a bracket, forming a towing hook. Two towing ropes from the Anatoly Vasilyev and Galileo Galilei were secured to it.

For 10 hours, the Soviet cargo ship towed the damaged boat, with a rescue crew of 9 people on board, to the east. The towing speed was limited to 3 - 4 knots, but the improvised cable held the load. But at this rate, it will take several months, or even a year, to get to the base. But an order is an order.

However, at about 2 a.m. on October 6, almost exactly in the middle, the tow rope snapped. At that time, the American submarine Augusta was nearby, and there is an assumption that it was she who broke the cable by ramming it with her conning tower.

At 08:30 on October 6, the missile compartments of the drifting submarine began to quickly fill with water. At 10:44, the emergency crew, having tied a life raft to the boat, was taken on board the lifeboat. The commander remained on K-219,

At 10:55, when the cutting fence reached the water level. the commander of the missile submarine cruiser gave a red rocket and moved to the life raft, and was soon on the deck of the Krasnogvardeysk.

And only then were they able to reach him with a strange order from the Navy headquarters: “Due to the impossibility of further towing, disembark the crew on the cruiser and proceed under their own power to the nearest port of the Soviet Union.”

At 11:03 Moscow time, the boat sank in the Sargasso Sea at a depth of 5,500 meters, taking with it the body of sailor Preminin, two nuclear reactors and 14 missiles with nuclear warheads.

The crew was first transported to Cuba, and from there by plane to Moscow.
I learned about the subsequent development of events much later.

Another 4 people died from the consequences of poisoning with rocket fuel components:
captain 2nd rank Krasilnikov I., captain 3rd rank Markov V.,
captain-lieutenant Karpachev V., foreman 1st article Sadauskas R.

The submarine commander, captain 2nd rank Britanov, was expelled from the party and transferred to the reserve, without the right to wear a military uniform, under the article of service inconsistency.
In 1987, under the new Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Yazov, captain 2nd rank Britanov was cleared of all charges, and sailor Preminin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

In August 1997, for preventing a nuclear disaster at the cost of his life, Sergei Preminin was awarded the title “Hero of the Russian Federation.”

In 1998, the Minister of Defense canceled the wording of the transfer to the reserve of the K-219 commander, captain 2nd rank V.I. Britanova,
"due to official inconsistency."

Note:
(1) SSBN - strategic missile submarine cruiser. The 16th missile silo of nuclear submarine No. 213 was shut down due to an accident that occurred on August 31, 1973.
(2) From the subsequent findings of the commission investigating the disaster
(3) Annular gap - the space between the rocket and the walls of the shaft

On the screensaver of the SSBN K-219 after an emergency ascent

K-219
project 667A, 667AU

photo:

RPK "K-219" project 667AU after the accident.

historical reference:

1970 May 28
Laid down at the slipway of workshop No. 50 of the Sevmashpredpriyatie PA in Severodvinsk as a cruising submarine with ballistic missiles;

1971 October 18
Removed from the workshop and, after launching, delivered to the outfitting wall of the plant, completed construction according to the project 667AU. They say that during the launch, the bottle of champagne did not break. She was part of the 339th separate brigade of submarines under construction, training and repair at the BelVMB;

1972 February 8
Became part of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. Included in the 31st DiPL of the 3rd FPL KSF based in Yagelnaya Bay, Saida Bay (Gadzhievo, Murmansk Region);

1972
Second RPK crew K-32 K-219;

1973 August 31
She was in combat service. As a result of a false activation of the irrigation system at a depth of 100 m with the mine drainage valve and the manual valve in the open position on the jumper between the main drainage line of the boat and the mine drainage pipeline, communication between the cavity of the missile silo and the outboard environment occurred. The pressure in the shaft increased to 10 atmospheres, and the rocket tanks collapsed. When the mine was drained, the temperature exceeded +70°C, the irrigation system automatically activated, which prevented the combustion of rocket fuel in the mine and the further development of the accident. As a result of the correct actions of the crew, the submarine returned to base on its own. Only one missile and silo were disabled. Serious consequences were avoided, but several people were poisoned by rocket fuel components. Subsequently, the emergency missile silo was plugged and only 15 missile silos were used on the submarine;

1974 December 27
During combat service, due to erroneous actions of the bilge crew foreman, the air pressure was applied to pressurize the 10th compartment. The mechanical engineer on watch mistakenly assumed that the air pressure system had decompressed, declared an emergency alarm and depressurized the submarine compartments, as a result of which, due to repressurization of the radiation monitoring sensors, a signal of increased activity in the turbine compartments was lost. The submarine commander announced a “radiation danger” alarm. The foreman of the bilge crew, realizing the error of his actions, turned the control valve to its original position, and the flow of air pressure stopped. The created pressure was relieved by the operation of compressors within 1.5 hours;

1976
Completed the tasks of an autonomous BS;

1979 September 28 - 1980 December 12
Completed a medium repair at the Zvezdochka Shipyard in Severodvinsk;

1980
Transferred to the 19th DiPL of the 3rd FPL KSF with the same location;

1984 - 1985 winter
Completed BS tasks with the 1st crew (commander - Capt. 2nd R. Kolotygin K.S.);

1986 August
Entered the thirteenth combat service with the 1st RPK crew K-241 under the command of k.2r. Britanova I.A. When preparing the RPK for combat service, a very strict schedule was established, but due to identified malfunctions, the crew was unable to complete all the planned work in a timely manner. In particular, the replacement of the fittings of shaft No. 6 was carried out immediately before the inspection of the condition of the materiel by the naval commission. The inspection of the replaced fittings was carried out hastily, under the direction of the assistant flagship specialist. During the test, when the drainage valve was opened, water began to flow into the shaft. Without finding out the source of water flow (and it could be either a jumper valve or a seacock on the drainage line), the manager decided to turn off the alarm system about water flow into the mine;

1986 September 18
During routine maintenance at the RoK, the presence of water was discovered in shaft No. 6. An emergency alarm was not declared. The BC-2 crew restored the disabled alarm system on their own, but did not identify the cause of the water influx. In order to avoid increasing noise when the pumps are operating for drainage, at the suggestion of the operator of the pneumatic hydraulic systems control station, midshipman Chepizhenko, it was decided to drain the water in an unconventional way, using a process hose into the nearest latrine. Water was removed in an unusual way;

1986 October 3
After surfacing for a communication session at 05.38, an explosion occurred in missile silo No. 6, the RPK surfaced, and the crew became involved in the fight for survivability. An explosion in a nearby cabin killed sailors Smaglyuk N.L. and Kharchenko I.K. In the process of fighting for survivability, the commander of the warhead-2 cap. 3r died. Petrachkov A.V. The rescue tug "SB-406", located in the Faroe Islands, was sent to help the submarine in distress, the rescuer "Agatan" left the base in Cuba, the nuclear-powered missile cruiser "Kirov" with the first crew on board and ships left the bases on the Kola Peninsula provision. The emergency party attempted to pump the emergency shaft with sea water, as a result of which the bilge line valve connecting the systems to the outboard space remained open, other RPK compartments were gassed, and when leaving the emergency party, measures were not taken to seal the missile compartments. By 16.00, the crew remained in the end compartments, the emergency protection of the reactor on one side was reset due to a short circuit in the main power network, the GKP lost control of the situation, believing that a fire was ongoing in the 4th, 5th and 6th compartments and a possible missile explosion. At 18.40, the emergency party sent to the 6th compartment discovered heavy smoke, which was mistaken for a fire. LOX was supplied to the compartment, after which the power supply to the 380 V network was lost and at 18.50 the emergency protection of the reactor was activated. However, the compensating grids did not lower onto the lower end switches, which had to be done manually, sending an emergency batch into the compartment three times, during which sailor S.A. Preminin died, who manually lowered the absorber rods (later on 08/07/1997, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation);

1986 October 4
By 03.00, the crew left the RPK for the approaching ships, only the watch on the navigation bridge and the submarine commander remained on the RPK, the central post was visited periodically, continuous monitoring of the situation in the compartments was not carried out. The sea state reached 4 points;

1986 October 5
At 18.15, the RPK was towed by the motor ship "Krasnogvardeysk", but after 12 hours of towing, the towing cable broke. It was not possible to restart the tug, the RPK began to lose buoyancy, after which 10 people from the emergency party left the RPK. According to the report of the personnel who left the RPK, it was not possible to inspect the RPK compartments due to the conning hatch being stuck in the closed position;

1986 October 6
At 11.03, the RPK sank at a depth of 5500 meters, at a point with coordinates 31˚28.1 N, 54˚41.3 W. The rescued crew was taken to Cuba and then to Moscow;

Causes of the accident. The root cause of the emergency was a malfunction of the missile silo fittings. Commander of warhead-2 cap.3 r. Petrachkov A.V. hid the malfunction from the submarine commander, and during the voyage several times removed the water entering the mine in an abnormal way (into the scupper of the latrine). To prevent the entry of water, the shaft was blown with compressed air, which ultimately led to the depressurization of the rocket’s fuel tanks. After a signal about an accident in mine No. 6 (presence of water), cap. 3 r. Petrachkov A.V. hid the current situation from the boat commander and asked him to surface under the pretext of checking the sensors. Midshipman Chepizhenko switched the irrigation control to routine mode, which turned off the automatic irrigation switch, left his post and began draining water in the hold using a process hose. During this draining process, the water pressure in the mine began to increase and became equal to the sea pressure, only then did he connect the drainage pump. After the drying of the mine was completed, oxidizer began to flow into the compartment through the process hose. An emergency alert was announced and the personnel put on protective equipment. At this time, the combustion process of rocket fuel was developing in the mine. Irrigation did not work because the equipment was switched to routine mode. After 4 minutes, the pressure in the shaft exceeded the strength of the shaft cover and it blew off. The pressure of the water hammer destroyed the irrigation pipes, the compartment was connected to the mine and the external environment. Subsequently, on the orders of the submarine commander, an emergency drain of the oxidizer from the rocket was prepared, which was no longer possible, since the rocket was destroyed. An attempt to drain the oxidizer using an abnormal connection of the pump led to a short circuit, a fire in the compartment and a part of the fittings being in poor condition. Having realized his guilt in what happened, cap. 3 r. Petrachkov A.V. gave the command to the personnel to evacuate, and he himself took off the protective gear and remained in the compartment (one version, according to another, his beard and mustache prevented him from putting on the mask correctly). After 78 hours, the RPK sank on an even keel due to the entry of sea water through shaft No. 6 into compartment 4 and the spread of water into other compartments. The PKK killed 4 people. Some sources indicate that cap. 3r. Markov V.P. and Capt. Lit. Korpachev V.N. died after being evacuated from the PKK from poisoning by rocket fuel fumes - this is not true. The version often repeated in many sources about the collision with the spy K-219 American submarine SSN 710 "Augusta" is unlikely. The official reasons (indicated in the instructions to submariners) are:
- Concealing an emergency situation with the RO and conducting emergency operations with the ROK, poor knowledge of the personnel of the material unit, its condition and use;
- Lack of performance and poor training in the fight for the survivability of the ship;
- Poor knowledge of personnel on measures to seal compartments;
- Poor training of personnel in assessing and forecasting the situation on the ship;

1986 November - December
The first crew was reorganized into the first RPK crew K-241, the second crew was reorganized into the second RPK crew K-245, first RPK crew K-241 reorganized into RPK crew K-219;

1987 September (presumably)
RPK crew K-219 reorganized into the second RPK crew K-444.

commanders of the first crew (military unit 34205):

1. Ivanov M.V. (1971-04.1977)
2. Sapozhkov B.I. (04.1977-10.1980)
3. Onuchin A.V. (11.1980-10.1983)
4. Kolotygin K.S. (11.1983-10.1986)
5. Khmyrov V.L. (10.1986-12.1986)
6. Britanov I.A. (12.1986-06.1987)
7. Bakaldin Yu.A. (06?.1987-09.1987)

commanders of the second crew (military unit 34205-A):

1. Zelentsov Yu.I. (1972-1974)
2. Petelin A.A. (1974-09.1977)
3. Safonov A.A. (09.1977-10.1984)
4. Sokolov V.P. (10.1984-12.1986)

commanders of other crews performing combat training missions on the K-219 RPK:

1. Kozlov A.N. (1979) 2nd crew of RPK K-140
2. Urbanovich E.A. (1981) 2nd crew of RPK K-210
3. Stoyanov V.A. (1984) 2nd crew of RPK K-137
4. Vasiliev A.N. (1985) 1st crew of RPK K-214
5. Britanov I.A. (1986) 1st crew of RPK K-241

Additional Information:

1. Article by Alikov V.I. to the 26th anniversary of the death of the K-219 SSBN (from the PRoAtom website).

List of sources:

1. Aleksandrov Yu.I., Gusev A.N. "Warships at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries", part 1, Galeya Print, St. Petersburg, 2000.
2. Berezhnoy S.S. "Nuclear submarines of the USSR and Russian Navy", MIA No. 7, Naval collection, 2001.
3. Apalkov Yu.V. "Submarines", vol. 1, part 1, Galeya Print, St. Petersburg, 2002.
4. Information from the website www.submarine.id.ru.
5. Apalkov Yu.V., Mant D.I., Mant S.D. "Domestic sea-based ballistic missiles and their carriers", Galeya Print, St. Petersburg, 2006.
6. "Domestic submarines. Design and construction", Central Research Institute named after. acad. A.N. Krylova, St. Petersburg, 2004.
7. Bukan S.P. "In the wake of underwater disasters", Guild of Masters, Rus', Moscow, 1992.
8. Rolin L.N., Rudenko Yu.G. "Experience in operating a naval missile system with the RSM-25 missile" (http://makeyev.msk.ru/pub/msys/1994/RSM-25.html)
9. Memoirs of crew members.

We kindly ask anyone who can add anything to the data provided or make corrections, please contact the author by e-mail:

© 2002-2017 Compiled by Ilya Kurganov and . All rights reserved.
Reproduction of the page in whole or in part in any form or form only with the written permission of the authors.
© 2002-2017 Design by Ilya S. Kurganov and Andrey S. Nikolaev. All rights reserved.
Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission of author is prohibited.

After spending more than 20 years in nuclear underwater warfare and making two powerful rounds in the arms race, the USA and the USSR created strategic and multi-purpose nuclear submarines and began an even more powerful third round. Both sides stated this openly. The Americans - as always, with pomp, our Minister of Defense, at that time he was Marshal D.F. Ustinov - with restraint. Using the already accumulated experience, the creators of new nuclear boats envisaged a unified system of construction, basing, operation and restoration of combat readiness on the principle of small and large cycles - with an expectation of approximately 30 years. In the USA, the new system was given the code name “Trident” (“Trident”), in the USSR - “Typhoon”.

The Typhoon nuclear-powered missile carriers have become the largest and most advanced submarines. They were no longer called boats. And what kind of “boat” is there if the displacement of this strategic missile submarine cruiser (SSBN) is 25 thousand tons, width - 25 meters, height - 26, and its length is twice as long as a football field! This “high-rise building” has almost everything, right down to a sauna and a relaxation room. Even the air that sailors breathe is no different from atmospheric air, although oxygen is extracted from seawater and automatically distributed among the compartments. In addition to traditional torpedoes, the main weapons of missile carriers are 20 ballistic missiles with ten multiple nuclear warheads, each of which weighs almost 100 tons and is capable of attacking ground targets at a distance of 10 thousand kilometers - with homing and high accuracy. The American Ohio boats have approximately the same characteristics.

True, we have only six Typhoons, while the Americans have eighteen Ohios, and each has 24 missiles...

Our power turned out to be catching up, although on September 16, 1955, we were the first to launch a ballistic missile from a submarine. However, in 1960, the United States already had three submarines with sixteen ballistic missiles on board. But we reached this level only in the early seventies.

The lead boat of this type, K-137, was accepted into the Navy on the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution - November 4, 1967. The chief designer of the K-137 was academician S. Kovalev, twice Hero of Socialist Labor and laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes, the responsible deliverer was V. Frolov. Rear Admiral A. Petelin, Hero of the Soviet Union, was appointed chairman of the government commission. I was lucky enough to personally take part in the factory and government tests of this amazing ship. Both as a member of the government commission, and by virtue of his position - deputy commander of a formation of nuclear submarines. Immediately after the ship was launched in Severodvinsk, it was visited by the country's top leaders: L. Brezhnev, A. Kosygin, Defense Minister A. Grechko. This visit was not a formal event. Brezhnev and Kosygin with a large retinue walked around the entire ship from bow to stern, and this, given their age, was a decent load. Kosygin was especially interested in everything. He made decisions on the spot. On September 6, 1967, the first missile launch took place from the silo of an underwater missile carrier, and already in October a successful salvo of several missiles was fired. Captain First Rank V. Berezovsky was appointed commander of the K-137; he later became a rear admiral, Hero of the Soviet Union.

In February 1970, American President Richard Nixon noted in his message to Congress: “The inevitable reality of the seventies is the presence in the Soviet Union of powerful and sophisticated strategic forces, in many respects approaching ours, and in some categories even surpassing them...” . The disadvantage of our project was the short firing range, forcing submarines to make transitions to the US shores in the combat patrol area, and therefore to overcome NATO anti-submarine lines. However, by 1972 we made a breakthrough. The Project 667-B submarine with RSM-40 missiles, which had a flight range of up to nine thousand kilometers, entered the Navy.

These submarines could hit targets from anywhere in the World Ocean or without leaving their own base. The commander of the lead boat of this project was V. Frolov, who for the first time in the USSR Navy received the rank of rear admiral while being the commander of the ship. The entry into the Navy of Project 667 and 667-B missile carriers and their modifications finally secured the parity of the underwater nuclear power of the superpowers.

The table clearly shows that the USSR was constantly and significantly behind the United States. Unfortunately, the United States realized earlier than us the importance of deploying nuclear strategic forces under water and began introducing multi-charge warheads of these missiles earlier. The activity of creating missile submarines was not only difficult, but also dangerous. There were costs, people and ships were lost. A low bow to the sailors and foremen, midshipmen and officers who honestly fulfilled their duty on the lost missile submarines - “S-80”, “K-129” and “K-219”...

K-219 disaster

In 1986, five months after the Chernobyl tragedy, a short TASS report appeared in Soviet newspapers:

“On the morning of October 3, a fire occurred in one of the compartments on a Soviet nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles on board in an area approximately 1000 km northeast of Bermuda. The crew of the submarine and the approaching Soviet ships are eliminating the consequences of the fire. There are casualties on board the submarine. Three people died. A commission of specialists in Moscow analyzed the current situation. The commission came to the conclusion that there is no danger of unauthorized actions of weapons, a nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination of the environment.”

On October 7, TASS again briefly informed the country about the fate of the damaged submarine: “During October 3-6, the crew of our submarine and the personnel of the approaching Soviet ships fought to ensure unsinkability. Despite the efforts made, the submarine could not be saved. On October 6 at 11:03 a.m. she sank at great depths.

The crew was evacuated to Soviet ships. There were no crew casualties other than those reported on October 4. The circumstances leading to the death of the boat continue to be investigated, but the immediate cause is the rapid penetration of water from outside. The reactor is shut down. According to experts, the possibility of a nuclear explosion and radioactive contamination of the environment is excluded.”

The message gave me a real shock. As a participant in the creation and development of these ultra-modern strategic ships, I signed the acceptance certificate under the words that characterized the SSBN as “the best ship of our time.” And this was not just a loud phrase - the boats of this project confirmed our assessment by the impeccable fulfillment of assigned tasks for 20 years!

No other publications appeared in the press, as was customary then. I was in prison at that time and had no other source of information other than newspapers. From them I learned about the Chernobyl disaster. He immediately contacted numerous authorities, even wrote to M. Gorbachev, offering his services as an expert and practitioner. I was sure that with my thirty years of experience in dealing with nuclear reactors I would be much more useful at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant than in the colony. Of course, I received no answer. Later I managed to arrange the delivery of the necessary documentation, but I prefer not to specify how. The dead K-219 haunted me. Over and over again I asked myself the question: how was it possible to sink a boat with a buoyancy reserve of several thousand tons, having the entire crew and only one gassed compartment?.. After all, the crew had the power of both reactors, a full supply of high-pressure air and a hundred percent set of individual rescue equipment. All mechanisms and systems, including fire and drainage equipment, and backup energy sources were in good working order. Not to mention the fact that the vast majority of them on the boat are duplicated...

All that remained for me in my forced idleness was to analyze the situation for days, relying only on my own experience. And yet - I remembered! Back in the mid-seventies, a similar accident occurred on this boat, in missile silo No. 6. There were malfunctions in the mine, and the personnel knew about them before going to sea. However, at that time the accident did not have serious consequences. Only after liberation did I manage to meet with the commander of the warhead-5 of this boat, captain of the second rank Igor Anatolyevich Krasilnikov, and see photographs of the ship in distress taken from a helicopter. I also talked with members of the investigation commission, as well as with the officers who wanted to be put on trial. In 1997-1998, he clarified many details directly from the boat commander I. Britanov, senior assistant I. Kurdin and navigator E. Aznabaev. Based on all this evidence, I present the circumstances of the death of K-219.

What happened? An oxidizer leak and an explosion occurred in one of the missile silos. Ultimately, a fire broke out in the fourth rocket compartment; the fire could not be contained. It spread throughout the ship. Some of the personnel were poisoned by fuel vapors and combustion products. The captain of the second rank, Igor Petrovich Britanov, commanded the boat on that voyage. The order was given to leave the fourth compartment and move to the fifth. Three - captain of the third rank A. Petrachkov, sailors Smoglyuk and Kharchenko, were carried out in an unconscious state. They soon died.

The submarine surfaced, and the second side of the power plant was put into operation. The fire in the fourth compartment did not subside, despite the flow of water. Moreover, a short circuit occurred and the emergency protection of the starboard reactor was activated. The alarm displayed on the control panel indicated that two compensating grids had not reached the required lower position... It was necessary to try to lower the grids manually, otherwise the reactor could start at any minute. Nothing complicated was required, however. It was enough to find the place where the special key was inserted and turn it all the way. However, emergency batches were sent to the compartment three times - each time they returned with nothing. It is difficult to imagine a crew in which the reactor compartment sailors do not know where to insert the key. Nevertheless, a fact is a fact.

There was only one last hope left. An experienced sailor Sergei Anatolyevich Preminin, one of the hold personnel directly servicing the reactor, served in the seventh compartment. It was he who went alone to the compartment and after a while reported via broadcast to the control panel of the main power plant: “The work is completed!” Everyone breathed a sigh of relief: the worst would not happen. But the unexpected happened - as a result of the fire, the high-pressure air system ruptured, and this air penetrated into all the compartments. The submariners fighting the fire immediately felt like they were in a descending plane. High blood pressure in itself did not pose a danger; it was enough to blow out the ears. The problem was different. As the pressure in the adjacent compartments increased, the exit hatches of the reactor compartment did not open: in this only uninhabited compartment the pressure remained at 1 atm. And one person was simply unable to open the exit hatch. Of course, every submariner, from commander to sailor, knows what needs to be done to open the bulkhead door - you need to open the pressure equalization valve. But Preminin was too weakened by carbon monoxide to independently get from the reactor lid to the valves...

An emergency party was sent to help Preminin, but they were unable to rescue the sailor. Meanwhile, the situation in the next compartment became so complicated that it became too risky to send emergency parties at all; they might not return.

I cannot comment on this tragic episode without pain. The compartment held Perminin like a trap. For a long time, the control panel of the power plant and the central post listened to his words and suppressed sobs. The commander of the warhead-5 and the commander of the first division spoke to Sergei, but the sailor understood that he was doomed...

The boat slowly but inevitably continued to increase its draft on an even keel. The crew was evacuated on boats to Soviet ships. The commander remained in the control room with nine crew members to fight until the end for the survivability of the ship. But when the submarine, exposing its propellers, began to bury its nose and the control room began to be overwhelmed by waves, the submariners had to abandon ship. Only one sailor, Preminin, remained in the reactor compartment. What did this healthy, fully conscious man feel when he sacrificed himself to prevent a chain reaction on the ocean floor in the indefinite future? Alas, we will never know this... The trim increased, then the lights went out, the boat began to sink, and long before it hit the bottom at a depth of 5000 m, the ocean flattened its hull like a tube of toothpaste.

The commander-in-chief reported three times

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Nikolaevich Chernavin, the last Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Soviet Union, spoke about how the country’s leadership perceived this incident in his book “Atomic Submarine”. He's writing:

“The ship’s commander, captain of the second rank Britanov, reported to us about the fire on the K-219, when it became clear that the fire could not be localized and the strategic boat, having been forced to break its secrecy, surfaced. Having received the first signal about the accident, I, as urgently as possible, made a report to the Minister of Defense S.L. Sokolov. He asked worriedly:

What happened there and how?

I don’t know yet, we’ll figure it out,” I answered.

Figure it out!

The conversation turned out to be short and quite calm. Although I felt disgusting. Wow, such a nuisance, we haven’t had such an accident for a long time and, of course, taking office with such an incident is not to envy oneself.

He continued to report to the Minister of Defense about what we became aware of. He created a group of naval specialists and industry specialists, which, as Information became available, developed recommendations and measures to save the ship. Suddenly I received a call from the secretariat of the Central Committee:

Tomorrow at 10 o'clock there will be a meeting of the Politburo, where you will be heard about the submarine accident. Your question appears first. A short report needs to be prepared.

I, of course, did not imagine that they would listen to me. I took this with concern, but understood that the severity of the accident corresponded to the attention of this level. The boat is strategic, on board are 16 missiles with special charges, nuclear torpedoes, two reactors. Trouble happened not far from the USA, and even on the eve of M.S.’s meeting. Gorbachev with R. Reagan in Reykjavik. That is, the political resonance can be very serious. In preparation for the Politburo meeting, I saw my task as briefly, intelligibly, without special details, to tell, based on the information we had, what happened on the nuclear-powered ship. So I did. They listened to me very carefully and, as I was convinced, with an understanding of what was being said. This was evidenced by the questions asked. The Politburo was even asked about the danger of hydrogen release from batteries. I explained that hydrogen, when mixed with air, forms an explosive gas...

Questions were asked by M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, E.K. Ligachev, L.N. Zaikov, Yu.D. Maslyukov. I said that the main thing now is not to let the submarine sink. The danger is that the burning compartments are battened down and therefore uncontrollable, since, unfortunately, there are no instruments on the boat that could be used to monitor the condition of the compartment abandoned by personnel. A fire in the compartment is also dangerous because the seals of many outboard devices burn out and the possibility of water entering from overboard arises. Everyone understood everything, the atmosphere was businesslike and calm, which, of course, made it possible to analyze the situation more balancedly and thoroughly. The Minister of Defense behaved quite calmly in this critical situation for the Armed Forces. I called him myself twice a day. Sometimes he had to give long explanations... The next day they listened to me again at the Politburo.

And the third time I reported to the Politburo members was when the boat had already sank. All attention was focused on the questions: are torpedoes, missiles, reactors safe? How likely is a nuclear explosion or reactor explosion? What could be the scale of radioactive contamination? I have now given detailed explanations. Scientists of the highest rank were involved in analyzing the situation. The issue of official communication was also considered there. As you know, it was short.

To determine the causes of the accident and the death of the boat, a State Commission was created headed by Politburo member L.N. Zaikov. But, whatever the root cause of the accident, the commander and crew made many mistakes, and, first of all, they failed to localize the fire, allowed it to develop and pollute the entire ship with toxic combustion products. Even before going to sea, they experienced minor oxidizer leaks in one of the mines. The malfunction was fixed without giving much attention. When the oxidizer showed itself at sea, they considered that this was not yet an accident, that a malfunction had arisen again, which had already been eliminated. Time was lost, and then the accident developed uncontrollably. But even then many mistakes could have been avoided. In particular, only because precautions were not taken, some sailors were poisoned.

All in all. The state commission came to the conclusion that the fault of the personnel prevailed in the accident and its consequences.” The death of K-219 was the first military disaster of the perestroika era. However, the lessons of Chernobyl had already been learned by Soviet leaders. Moscow immediately notified Washington, which made a favorable impression overseas. “If Gorbachev had maintained the Soviet Union's standard secrecy and denied the catastrophe despite the obvious facts, he might have created distrust of the summit,” the New York Times wrote in those days.

Don't be a fool, America!

The basis for constructing another hypothesis about the cause of the death of the boat is provided by a message from the American press. On October 5, 1986, the Washington Post reported: “American submarine specialists confirmed that even before Gorbachev informed Reagan about what had happened, the United States already knew about what happened on the Soviet submarine. Although they did not want to disclose details regarding who was the first to report the accident. It probably came from an American submarine tracking a Soviet submarine. Such surveillance is common practice."

Later, information appeared in American newspapers that in the first half of October 1986, “a US Navy nuclear submarine, while patrolling in the Atlantic Ocean, received damage to its hull as a result of a collision with an underwater object and arrived at its home port of New London (Connecticut) for repair work in dry dock." The article specified that the identified damage concerned the bow bottom of the hull and the fairing of the hydroacoustic station. Strange damage was also found on the body of the K-219. After the boat surfaced, the senior assistant commander, captain of the third rank S. Vladimirov and navigator E. Aznabaev noticed along the left side - from the emergency shaft towards the stern - a double furrow with a metallic sheen. It could have been carried out by the cover of the missile silo torn off by the explosion. But it is possible that the furrow was also left by a foreign submarine that came into direct contact with our submarine.

The likelihood of a collision with an American submarine is indirectly confirmed by another circumstance. Contrary to custom, the American military did not make a fuss about the disaster of a Soviet nuclear-powered ship in the waters of the Atlantic. “Pentagon officers behave as if there is a mutual interest between the United States and the USSR not to ring the bell to the whole world about the loss of a Soviet submarine,” noted a journalist from the London Times with undisguised surprise.

How realistic is such a collision under water?.. Six years after the K-219 disaster, on February 11, 1992, the following incident occurred in the Soviet territorial waters of the Barents Sea. The American nuclear submarine Baton Rouge, with a displacement of 6 thousand tons, armed with Tomahawk missiles, was collecting intelligence information about naval activity in the area. It is difficult to say whether the Baton Rouge was spying on our Sierra-class nuclear-powered vessel or, on the contrary, it was “passing” the Americans, but at some point both ships fell into the acoustic “shadow” zone and collided. There were parts marked “Made in the USA” on the hull of our nuclear-powered vessel, so the Pentagon could not deny its involvement in the incident. It is characteristic, however, that his representative B. Hall admitted: before the incident was made public, this issue was discussed by Secretary of State D. Baker at a meeting with the Russian President. Was there a similar preliminary discussion after the death of K-219?..

Unless, of course, the cause of the disaster was precisely the collision of two boats playing cat and mouse. In this case, of course, publicity would not suit either the USSR or the USA.

By the way, in 1992 I vehemently objected in the press - both regional and central - against dangerous games with the lives of submariners. Komsomolskaya Pravda published my article at the end of March entitled “Don’t be a fool, America!” with the question in the subtitle: "Why don't we sue the US Navy?" In this material I wrote: “February 11 of this year. collided between the US submarine Baton Rouge and the multi-purpose nuclear submarine of the united armed forces of the CIS.” Of course, this became a sensation for many. But not for professional submariners. Over the course of 30 years of naval service, I have more than once encountered and then restored submarines that returned from an increasingly crowded ocean with mangled deckhouses or damaged bow ends. Such damage can only be obtained from collisions with submarines and surface ships. In the 70s, in the Mediterranean Sea, our nuclear submarine with cruise missiles on board collided with a US Navy surface ship while surfacing. In 1973, in the Caribbean Sea, at a depth of more than 120 meters, our nuclear submarine at a decent speed collided with an underwater reef unmarked on the map. The impact was so strong that the torpedo tubes loaded with simple nuclear charges were “bent” by 90 degrees. It was only a miracle that the ship's mechanisms were not torn off the foundations and the emergency protection of the reactors was not activated.

There were also a number of incidents under water, after which many mysterious misunderstandings remained. Over the last decade, there are only two cases when the “authorship” of an emergency is beyond doubt: the last one, on February 11, 1992, and a similar situation in the same Kola Bay in 1981. The only difference is that in 1981, an American submarine rammed the stern of our newest strategic missile submarine. Then our boat surfaced and arrived at the base under its own power. The naval commission, in which I also had to work (the commission included: Vice Admiral M.M. Budaev, Academician I.D. Spassky - head of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, academician N.S. Khlopkin, G.A. Gladkov from IAZ named after Kurchatov), found pieces of wheelhouse casing, plexiglass, and countersunk bolts in the damaged tanks. It was determined that they belonged to the US Sturgeon-class submarine. A few days later, a US nuclear submarine surfaced in the area of the British naval base of Holy Loch with a damaged conning tower. We asked to double check. Yes, they reported to us, a Sturgeon-class boat... The conclusions of the commissions were, naturally, not published in the press at that time. Only today I can talk about the main one of them. Having simulated the maneuver situation of two submarines, the commission found that the American one was watching ours and remained in the acoustic shadow. When the USSR submarine changed course, the underwater “filter” did not have time to react and blindly crashed into the stern with its wheelhouse. Neither the Russian Federation nor the United States took diplomatic steps regarding the February incident in the Kola Bay. However, both sides admitted the fact of a submarine collision underwater, which would not have been possible in pre-perestroika times. Another sign of democratization: the commander of our submarine was not punished. It's really not his fault. The authorship of the clumsy maneuver belongs to the commander of the US submarine. Why shouldn't the American side, in this case, pay the cost of repairing our damaged boat? I believe that the CIS Navy should file a claim with the International Court of Justice and its restoration should be carried out at the expense of the US Navy.

America is a country with deep democratic traditions that respects and abides by laws. When, for example, two seiners collide and the International Court recovers money from the guilty party, no one doubts the legality of such actions. Why can't we file a claim in case of a submarine collision? For us, filing a claim - the US Navy, as the culprit of the incident, is not only legal, but also economically necessary. Despite mutual assurances that the damage was insignificant, I think the situation is different. The blow struck the hull from below. He turned out to be strong, as our boat even sank. Even non-specialists understand what happens when two metal behemoths weighing 8 and 6 thousand tons collide.

Restoring our boat will require serious material costs. Friendship is friendship, but to blame, pay... If we remain silent today, if we do not act according to the laws accepted in a civilized society, we simply will not be understood - especially abroad.

I then addressed a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Nikolaevich Chernavin. I received a response relatively quickly - in the form of a report from the Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Admiral K. Makarov, with the resolution of the Commander-in-Chief “I agree.” I think this document is of considerable interest not only to me. I quote it in its entirety:

“To the Commander of the Navy, Admiral V.N. Chernavin. I report: an appeal to you from Rear Admiral of the Reserve N.G. Mormul. compensation for damages at the expense of the US Navy through an international court for the collision of our submarine with the submarine Baton Rouge in February 1992 was considered. The following has been established.

1. There are no international rules for preventing collisions between submarines of different countries underwater. COLREG-72 ensures the safety of navigation of ships and vessels that are only on the surface, in visual or radar visibility of each other.

2. Considering that the issue of preventing submarine collisions is not regulated by international law, there are no grounds for appealing to an international court.

3. Both commanders are to blame for the collision of these submarines, as well as any other ships. It is not possible to establish the degree of guilt of each of them in this case.

4. On the occasion of this clash, a note was presented to the US government on behalf of the Russian government. The main cause of the collision was the violation of Russian territorial waters by a US Navy submarine. The American side violated our terms. water is denied. The issue of this incident was discussed at the 6th Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.

5. The Russian and American sides recognized the existence of the problem of preventing incidents with submarines. In May 1992, the first working meeting of representatives of the Russian Navy and the US Navy on this issue took place in Moscow, during which we proposed specific measures to prevent collisions between submarines of our countries in the Navy’s combat training grounds.

The parties agreed to continue dialogue on this issue.

Regarding the establishment of mutually recognized boundaries of territorial waters, negotiations between experts of the two countries will begin in the near future through the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Admiral of the Fleet K. Makarov.”

So it’s not hard to guess: in the coming years, we will hardly be able to “adjust” international law and thereby at least partially resolve the complex problem of underwater collisions...

Secret decree

As for the death of K-219, in 1986, as happened most often in the Navy, the story was hushed up. The official bodies investigating the causes of the disaster remained impenetrably silent. The Washington Post newspaper, publishing the opinion of American submariners, wrote in the same year, 1986: “US Navy experts came to the conclusion that the commander and crew of the submarine deserve high praise for quickly being able to surface, as well as for their actions in fighting with fire." However, the opinion of specialists in the USSR Navy was fundamentally different from the judgment of their American colleagues.

Preminin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star, but senior lieutenant N. Belikov, who together with a sailor prevented a nuclear accident, was expelled from the CPSU. For the loss of a party card, the red book remained in the safe at one of the combat posts and went to the bottom of the ocean along with the ship... As the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper now boldly writes, the personnel “... were rewarded by the fact that they were not sent to prison " In the same year, 1986, a secret order from the Minister of Defense on the K-219 disaster and the punishment of individual officials was read out to the Navy formations.

The crew was disbanded, the commander, captain of the second rank, Igor Britanov, and the commander of the BC-5, captain of the second rank, Igor Krasilnikov, were expelled from the CPSU and transferred to the reserve due to service inconsistency. They tried to bring both of them to criminal liability. The chairman of the St. Petersburg club of submariners, Igor Kurdin, who at that time served in the same formation with Britanov and Krasilnikov, told me that he had the opportunity to read the definition of the investigation. Kurdin quoted from memory excerpts from the resolution to terminate the criminal case: “Taking into account the emergency situation on board the submarine associated with the accident of the missile system due to external influence on the submarine, not through the fault of its crew, there is a lack of guidelines for combating an accident of this kind “, and also taking into account the long, impeccable service on the submarine of Captain 2nd Rank I. Britanov and Captain 2nd Rank I. Krasilnikov, sincere repentance and the presence of both minor children, the criminal case against Britanov and Krasilnikov is terminated.”

The well-known naval journalist Vladimir Gundarov, who has been working on this topic for almost ten years, writes that for a long time, high authorities tried to impose a taboo on any information about the K-219. The materials of the commission are closed, all witnesses are bound by a subscription not to disclose state secrets... Perhaps this is why the feat of the sailor and the courage of the crew remained a secret for so long.

The heroic deed of the Russian sailor Sergei Preminin was first reported in May 1987 by the Northern Fleet newspaper “On Guard of the Arctic.” In October 1991, the magazine “Echo of the Planet” wrote about Preminin and the K-219 crew. In 1992, my book, co-authored with my commanders L. Osipenko and L. Zhiltsov, “The Dramatic History of the Russian Fleet,” was published in France, where a separate chapter was devoted to the disaster of this submarine, the tragedy and heroism of its crew. Later, in 1994, when our book “The Nuclear Underwater Epic” was published in Russia, the Russian public also learned about “K-219”.

On August 7, 1997, President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin signed a Decree conferring the title of Hero of the Russian Federation on sailor Sergei Anatolyevich Preminin (posthumously). The publication of the book “Hostile Waters” by Igor Kurdin, Peter Huchthausen and Alan White in New York obviously played a role in this. At the beginning of 1997, the premiere of the film of the same name took place. After this, letters from abroad began to arrive addressed to the President of the Russian Federation. Here is what, for example, Allan Petty wrote to Boris Yeltsin from Barkar Castle in Statford (Great Britain):

“This man, Sergei Preminin, is one of the bravest in the world. He did everything he could to save the world from nuclear holocaust and then died in the most horrific and sad way. I would be grateful to you if you could forward this letter to the parents of Sergei Preminin. Or if you could tell them what I think: their son is one of the bravest men who ever lived on earth, and I will always be grateful to him for his feat. I will never forget what he did, since he is one of the few people who saved the world at the cost of his life...”

By the way, the Congress of the United States of America is going to consider the issue of awarding Sergei Preminin with the highest award of his country - the Congressional Medal. Fellow countrymen erected a modest monument to Sergei in his homeland in the town of Krasavichi. Alas, the monument had to be dismantled because the foundation was washed away by water... However, not everything turned out well, not only in the Handsome Ones. It’s strange, of course, but the very fact of awarding Preminin the Golden Star of the Hero of the Russian Federation remained a secret in the capital for two months. The award decree never appeared in print. As the administration of the President of the Russian Federation explained to the chairman of the organizing committee of the St. Petersburg Submariners Club, Captain 1st Rank Igor Kurdin, this Decree is closed and cannot be published. Apparently, this is only the beginning of a long journey towards the rehabilitation of the K-219 crew.

Commander I. Britanov, after demobilization, went to Sverdlovsk, where he found a job and got an apartment. He continues to fight to restore justice, but who can say how many more years it will take for the heroes to be called heroes?..

In 1989, the Commander of the Northern Fleet, V. Popov, who then held the position of division commander, was not afraid to sign the first proposal for the Hero - Preminin. The performance was shelved. Popov signed the second proposal when he was already the commander of the flotilla. It didn't work either. The stubborn admiral did not stop and, already as the chief of staff of the Northern Fleet, signed the third proposal in 1996. He was supported by the head of the administration of the city of Skalisty G. Tsvetko, the head of the administration of the Vologda region V. Pozgalev, the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Murmansk region I. Menshikov, the St. Petersburg Club of Submariners and many other public organizations.

Commander Captain 1st Rank Igor Britanov gave me a list of personnel of the K-219 SSBN, in which he indicated the crew members worthy of nomination for state awards:

captain 2nd rank I.P. Krasilnikov

captain 3rd rank S.V. Vladimirov

captain 3rd rank V.I. Wheat

captain 3rd rank V.P. Markov (posthumously)

captain 3rd rank E.R. Aznabaev

captain 3rd rank G.Ya. Kapitulsky

captain 3rd rank O.M. Lysenko

Lieutenant Commander Yu.V. Babenko

Lieutenant Commander V.A. Osipov

Lieutenant Commander S.V. Vorobiev

Captain-Lieutenant N.N. Belikov

medical service lieutenant I.A. Kochergin

midshipman A.D. Vasilchuk

Midshipman A.I.Baidin

captain 3rd rank Yu.O.Sergienko

Captain-Lieutenant V.V. Vishtalenko

Captain-Lieutenant A.I. Simakov

Captain-Lieutenant V.N. Korpachev (posthumously)

Lieutenant Commander I.O. Kretov

senior lieutenant Yu.M. Demyan

Senior Lieutenant S.G. Skryabin

Senior Lieutenant A.K. Konoplev

Senior Lieutenant O.P. Kuzmenko

midshipman V.N. Yezhov

midshipman V.V. Shvidun

midshipman V.V. Gasparyan

midshipman I.V. Lyutikov

sailor V.P. Ananenko

Captain-Lieutenant V.V. Kiselev

Lieutenant Commander S.A. Prikhunov

Lieutenant Commander S.N. Ryazanov

Senior Lieutenant O.V. Guskov

Senior Lieutenant P.M. Dolmatov

senior lieutenant S.A. Cherkasov

midshipman V.O. Zhdanov

midshipman N.T. Shpakov

midshipman V.P. Smolev

sailor V.L. Mayorov

Captain 3rd rank V.P. Markov and captain-lieutenant V.N. Korpachev died after being evacuated from a submarine from poisoning by rocket fuel vapors. In total, six people died on the submarine.

captain 3rd rank A. Petrachkov

captain 3rd rank V. Markov

Lieutenant Commander V. Korpachev

sailor N. Smoglyuk

sailor I. Kharchenko

sailor S. Preminin

Eternal glory to the submarine heroes!

Submarine accident by 219. Secret disaster in the Sargasso Sea. Possible causes of death