The date of the Battle of the Sit River (or the Battle of Sit, as it is also called) is considered to be March 4, 1238. This is what Wikipedia says, but some researchers question this date and claim that the battle took place on March 1.

The warring parties were the army of Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir and several thousand Mongols under the leadership of Burundai, Batu’s temnik.

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The battle was destined to become a key one for both the Russians and the Mongols:

the defeat of the troops of Yuri Vsevolodovich broke the resistance of the rulers of North-Eastern Rus' to the Mongols, and they were easily able to establish control over these lands;
The battle on the Sit River weakened the Mongol forces so much that they had to abandon the campaign against Novgorod.

Background of the battle

Shortly before the battle, the Horde troops took Vladimir, defeated the Ryazan and Novgorod forces and took control Vladimir-Suzdal Principality. After this, the prince left his possessions and settled down with several warriors in the forests near the Sit River (in the north-west of the modern Yaroslavl region).

The Horde was well aware of the dislocation of Prince Yuri's forces and their numbers. This information was given out by Prince Gleb. This allowed Batu work out the battle plan in detail and form several detachments, which in total number significantly exceeded the troops of Rus'.

Progress of the battle on the Sit River

Events before the battle

The Battle of Sita took place after the Mongols took Tver. Consequently, Yuri Vsevolodovich waited for the enemy to attack It was from this city that he believed that all of Batu’s forces were concentrated in that area. Some of the troops of the Steppe Horde were indeed there, but several tens of thousands of horsemen went in other directions:

after the capture of Rostov (it was February 20, 1238), the troops under the leadership of Burundai divided: some of the soldiers headed for Yaroslavl, and the rest went with Batu’s temnik to Uglich;
near Uglich the army was again divided into two parts. Thus, two out of three detachments were formed that attacked the forces of Rus';
The third detachment was Yaroslavl. His task was to attack the forces of Yuri Vsevolodovich from the north and northeast.

As mentioned above, the prince did not know that his troops would be attacked from several sides. It is believed that Yuri Vsevolodovich did not conduct exploration of the southern and southeastern lands. There is also an opinion that the guards of the Russian troops simply overslept the enemy.

The Russian troops did not notice the Mongols also because the detachments approached them very quietly. If Batu's troops organized pogroms and burned the conquered villages, then Burundai preferred to quietly approach the settlements that needed to be taken, capture them, and only after that carry out pogroms.

It is also obvious that the Mongols had very well pre-researched the map of the area and reliably isolated the lands that they planned to attack.

How the fighting developed

The detachments of Prince Yuri were stretched over 100 kilometers. Dorozha's regiment was defeated by Burundai's detachment at night, when the Russians were in the huts, and only a few hundred (according to other sources, dozens) guards guarded them. The Russians were surrounded by a tight ring, and only a few managed to get out of it.

Another detachment of Mongols attacked the convoys in Semyonovsky and Knyaginin, as well as the ambush detachment (and it was discovered even before the ambush was set up). Other Russian regiments sent several of their soldiers to the battle zone as assistance.

Third enemy detachment destroyed Velikoye Selo(it was never restored later). Then the troops of the Steppe Horde attacked the regiment located in the village of Pokrovskoye. Then the Russians began to be pushed out onto the City ice.

Two regiments of Prince Yuri were surrounded and defeated. None of the Russian soldiers survived - Prince Yuri also died. His head would later be presented to Batu Khan as a gift.

There were so many people fighting on the ice that it could not stand it and cracked. Accumulated at the battle site great amount bodies of the dead on both sides, due to which the flow of the river was stopped. That place later began to be called “the flesh.”

In total, the battle lasted two days. It took place in three places:

near Bozhonka and Mogilitsa;
in the area of the villages of Ignatovo, Krasnoe, Yuryevskaya and Stanilovo;
next to Pokrovsky, Semenovsky and Ignatov.

Aftermath of the Battle of City River

Battle of the Sit River

The Battle of the Sit River, or the Battle of Sitka, is a battle that took place on March 4, 1238 between the army of the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich and the corps of Burundai.

Yuri Vsevolodovich

Burunday

One of the central events of the Western (Kipchak) campaign of the Mongols (1236-1242) and the Mongol invasion of Rus' (1237-1240), in particular, one of the key battles of the Mongol campaign in North-Eastern Rus' (1237-1238).

Prerequisites

After the capture of Ryazan by the Mongols, the defeat of the united Russian forces near Kolomna and the Mongol invasion of the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, Yuri left his family and garrison in the capital under the command of Pyotr Osledyukovich and went to the forests near the City River (northwest of the modern Yaroslavl region of Russia), where he was appointed new gathering of troops.

Progress of the battle

The Mongol corps under the command of Burundai, within 3 weeks after the capture of Vladimir, covering a distance approximately twice as large as the main Mongol forces overcame during the same time, during the siege of Tver and Torzhok by the latter, approached the City from Uglich, the Vladimir army did not have time to prepare to the battle (with the exception of a guard of 3,000 people under the leadership of governor Dorofei Semyonovich), was surrounded and almost completely died or was captured. Prince Yuri died along with the army, his head was cut off and presented as a gift to Batu Khan.

The Yaroslavl prince Vsevolod Konstantinovich died. The captured Rostov prince Vasilko Konstantinovich was killed on March 4, 1238 in the Shernsky forest.

death of Vasilko Konstantinovich

Vsevolod Konstantinovich Vasilko Konstantinovich

Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich and Vladimir Konstantinovich Uglichsky managed to escape.

death of Yuri Vsevolodovich

Consequences

The defeat of the Russian troops broke the resistance of the princes of North-Eastern Rus' to the Mongol invasion and predetermined the fall of North-Eastern Rus' into dependence on the Mongol Empire.

After the death of Grand Duke Yuri, the grand-ducal throne was occupied by his brother, Prince of Pereyaslav Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, under whose direct control the Vladimir Principality and the Pereyaslavl-Zalessky Principality came to be.

Yaroslav Vsevolodovich

Burundai’s army turned out to be weakened after the battle (“they suffered a great plague, and a considerable number of them fell”), which was one of the reasons for Batu’s refusal to go to Novgorod.

The secret of the battle.

The mystery of the Battle of Sita still exists, both in the reasons for the sudden secret encirclement of Prince Yuri’s troops throughout almost the entire course of the City (more than 100 kilometers), and in the means and unsolved ways of Burundai’s temnik. How did a huge mass of troops (about 40,000 horsemen - four darkness) quietly approach and surround the Russian troops, passing through vast spaces on three sides?

The official date of the Battle of Sita, March 4, 1238, is in doubt. The date March 4, 1238 is the exact date of death of the Rostov prince Vasilko Konstantinovich, who was tortured to death in the Shirensky forest along with the captives.

Referring to the historian S. M. Solovyov, who was involved in determining the location of the Shirensky forest, V. A. Chivilikhin in his book “Memory” indicates that the Shirensky forest is now located 24 kilometers from the city of Kashin and 40 kilometers from the city of Kalyazin on the river Shirenka, a tributary of the Medveditsa River, that is, about 100 kilometers from the site of the Battle of Sita. He believes that after the battle Burundai walked to this forest for 3 days. Then, in his opinion, the Battle of Sita took place on March 1, 1238.

In our opinion, based on the same historical fact, the most likely date for the Battle of Sita is March 2, 1238, since Burundai was in a hurry to help the main forces of Khan Batu, who had already taken Tver on February 21, 1238 and were storming Torzhok for the second week. After which Batu Khan had to go to Novgorod.

In case of insufficiently justified delay, Burundai risked having his head cut off. The khan had no other punishments. Therefore, Burundai covered this path in 1.5-2 days.

However, according to S. A. Musin-Pushkin, expressed in his book “Essays on the Molozhsky District,” the Shirensky forest was located on the border of the Uglich and Romanovo-Borisoglebsky districts, where, as he claims, there was the Shirensky tract and the Vasili wasteland. However, on the territory of the Ramensky village council of the current Borisoglebsky district, the Shirenka River flows, and 10 kilometers away in the territory of the Yaroslavl district is the village of Shirenye. From the site of the Battle of Sita to the Shirenki River (via Myshkin) it is about 100 kilometers. Consequently, this detachment walked for two days. It follows that the Battle of Sita took place on March 2, 1238.

It should be noted that Burundai could not go to the Shiren tract or to the Shirenka River, since this path would take them to the southeast, and not to the west - to Torzhok and Novgorod. The prisoners with Prince Vasilko were led by another small detachment which was tasked with taking away the loot and prisoners.

Currently, on the issue of the location of the battle, scientists and local historians have come to a largely unanimous opinion, which is that in the area of the villages of Mogilitsy and Bozhonki there was a battle with the regiment of Dorozha (Dorofeya Semenov); in the area of the villages of Ignatova, Stanilov, Yuryevsky, Krasny - the battle of the central regiment under the command of Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich himself (on the Sit River there were three villages with the same name “Ignatovo”: near Sysoev, near Stanilov and near Semenovsky); the battle in the area of the villages of Semenovskoye, Ignatovo, Knyaginino, Pokrovskoye, Velikoye Selo is recognized, but the scope of this battle is kept silent, because the monument to the fallen soldiers stands opposite Ignatov, near Stanilov, which is not entirely fair.

Battle of the City River.

Most scientists and local historians recognize two directions of movement of Tatar detachments to Sit. The first is from the upper reaches of the City from Koy, the second is from the mouth of the City. But there is no firm opinion about where the troops came to the mouth of the City and to Koi. For example, Semyon Musin-Pushkin claims that the detachment came to the mouth of the City from Galich, and to Stanilov - from Bezhetsk, through Krasny Kholm.

Apparently Batu Khan stopped his troops in the Ryazan - Kolomna - Moscow - Vladimir region for a thorough and in-depth reconnaissance of the routes to Rostov - Yaroslavl - Mologa - Sit; to Rostov - Uglich - Koy - Voskresenskoye; to Uglich - Myshkin - Nekouz - Latskoye - Semenovskoye. Plans were carefully developed to capture Pereyaslavl, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Tver, Torzhok, Vologda, Galich (which they could not take) and the Battle of Sita. There were other tasks, for example, preparing feed for approximately 300,000 horses and food for more than 100,000 horsemen, etc.

Having taken Vladimir on February 7, 1238, Batu sent a detachment, possibly detachments, to defeat and destroy Suzdal and other weaker cities - as far as Yuryevets, Dmitrov, Kostroma, while at the same time entrusting them with the function of collecting and escorting loot, capturing and escorting prisoners to Tver and Torzhok for use in the construction of structures for storming fortress walls and filling ditches with their corpses, as well as convoying slaves for the slave trade and using them in the Horde.

assault on Vladimir

The main forces of Batu, having passed Yuryev-Polsky, attacked and destroyed Pereslavl-Zalessky within five days. Having covered a distance of 205 kilometers in two and a half days, we began the assault on Tver.

The Battle of Sita will take place after the capture of Tver on March 2, 1238 (official date March 4, 1238). That is why Prince Yuri expected an attack by the Tatar-Mongols from Tver, through Bezhetsk and Krasny Kholm along the shortest route. Yuri mistakenly believed that Batu had all his forces in Tver and Torzhok. One can blame Prince Yuri for the lack of long-range reconnaissance in the southern and southeastern directions. Some chronicles note that Yuri's guards overslept the enemy.

From the above, one more important conclusion can be drawn, namely, the main forces of Batu Khan did not participate in the Battle of Sita, and could not participate, since at that time they were conducting the most difficult, two-week assault on Torzhok. They did not have time to participate in the assault on Rostov the Great and Suzdal. There were other units there.

The conclusion about the speed of movement of Khan Batu is interesting. It makes it possible to determine the approximate timing of the capture of other cities. It turns out that the average speed of their movement was about 80 kilometers per day. This is the maximum possible speed in winter. Obviously, the steppe people were accustomed to resting in the saddle.

To storm and capture Rostov the Great, Yaroslavl, Vologda, Galich and defeat the troops of Prince Yuri, Batu Khan had to send strong troops, at least five tumens (tumen equals darkness), that is, 50,000 horsemen, under the overall command of Burundai. Rostov was taken on February 20, 1238, then the detachment under the overall command of Burundai split: part of it went to Yaroslavl; At the head of the main forces, Burundai went to Uglich, where he further divided his forces, forming two (first and second) operational detachments to attack the City. The third operational detachment to attack the troops of Prince Yuri from the north and northeast was the Yaroslavl detachment (about one darkness). The first operational detachment (two darkness) was commanded by Burundai himself, going from Uglich up the Vorokse River to Koya, then to the village. Voskresenskoye to City, the Second went from Uglich to Myshkin - Nekouz - Latskoye - Semenovskoye, with a smaller part of the detachment separating in Nekouz to Stanilovo. The Yaroslavl (third) operational detachment went along the Volga, the Mologa River to the mouths of the City and Udrusy rivers.

It is on the borders of Uglich and Yaroslavl that we come to the beginning of unraveling the mystery of the secretive encirclement of all three detachments of Prince Yuri, separately stretched at the beginning of the battle across the City over a distance of more than 100 kilometers, with small security detachments deployed along the western bank and, presumably, with a reserve regiment on the eastern bank between Semenovsky and Krasny, as well as detachments guarding convoys in Semenovsky, Knyaginin and on the left bank in Velikoye Selo (between Pokrovsky and Breytovo).

The solution to the mystery of the secrecy of the encirclement is that Burundai, in contrast to the noisy pogroms, arson and robbery by the main forces of Batu Khan, used the tactics of secretive transitions at night with the creation of a regime of absolute non-penetration of refugees, messengers and scouts to the City, as well as small detachments, going to Prince Yuri. And the pogroms of all the villages of these areas, with the complete destruction of the villages, the slaughter of people and the taking of those accidentally left into captivity, took place after the battle.

Obviously, a deep, massive secretive reconnaissance was carried out along all roads and paths, with the capture of “tongues”.

In addition to reconnaissance, a regime was created to isolate the entire City area from the outside world. Moreover, the secretive outposts of the Tatar-Mongols, penetrating at night along all roads and paths, were obviously echeloned, otherwise at least one hero would have broken into the camp of Prince Yuri to report the danger.

Thus, the first operational detachment of Burundai secretly concentrated near the village of Voskresensky, and the Yaroslavl detachment in the forest on the left bank of the Mologa above the village of Vetrina, in the area of the then built village of Penye (now in the flood zone). The second operational detachment, separated from Burundai’s detachment in Uglich and heading through Myshkin - Nekouz - partly to Stanilov, and mainly to the Semyonovsky convoys, also approached secretly. The route for this detachment was closer: to Stanilov - 71 kilometers, and through Latskoye to Semenovsky - 113 kilometers.

Timur-Len wrote in detail about the use of “round-up” tactics by the Tatar-Mongols. Its use in the Battle of Sith is confirmed by many chronicles and recognized by all researchers.

By the beginning of the battle, the Russian regiments were located in the following order. The first, a three-thousand-strong cavalry regiment led by Voivode Dorozh, was located in the upper reaches of the City, in the area of the villages of Mogilitsy and Bozhonki, with the aim of timely detection (reconnaissance) of the enemy and counter combat with his vanguard.

Dorofei Semyonov (Dorozh)

The second - the central detachment - in the area of the villages of Ignatovo - Stanilovo - Yuryevskoye - Krasnoe. There was the camp of the commander, Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich, with positions equipped for battle, with convoys in the area of the third regiment.

The third detachment (right-hand regiment) - in the area of Semenovsky, Ignatov (next to Semenovsky), Petrovsky, St. Merzleev and Velikoye Selo, which does not exist now. The detachment's tasks are to support the northern flank of the Russian troops and participate in the main battle. In accordance with the tactics of the Russian troops of that time, there should also be a reserve (ambush) regiment. The reserve regiment of Prince Yuri was most likely stationed on the eastern shore of the City, since Yuri considered it safe (he did not even route to the east), or rather between Semenovsky and Krasny, so that during the battle the regiment could go to the rescue as if in the camp Yuri, and to the northern regiment.

All three detachments at the time of the battle were stretched over a distance of more than 100 kilometers. Burundai, having reached the City, knew exactly the location of these detachments. Both from his reconnaissance and from prisoners, he also learned about the passage of the Dorozh regiment to the upper reaches of the City past the village of Voskresenskoye, where he went, expecting to meet Batu’s advance detachment from Bezhetsk, for he, like Yuri, believed that all the enemy forces were in Tver and Torzhok.

So, having reached the City near the village of Voskresenskoye, Burundai sent a strong detachment (about one darkness) in pursuit of Dorozh to destroy him near the villages of Mogilitsy, Bozhonki and others. This detachment smashed, slaughtered and burned everything in its path, because there was nothing left to hide.

That is why for a long time many scientists and local historians, including S.A. Musin-Pushkin, had the opinion that the Tatar-Mongols came from the west - from Bezhetsk through Red Hill. In fact, the main forces of Burundai went from Voskresensky, down the City.

The second encirclement detachment, presumably, was sent by Burundai to the mouth of the Vereksa River, 5-8 kilometers from Voskresensky, then up along it, to the Kovalevsky stream and further north, to join the northern third encirclement detachment in order to close the encirclement ring.

The third, northern encirclement detachment, just mentioned, separated, presumably, from the Yaroslavl operational detachment when approaching the mouth of the City River and rushed further up the Mologa (13 kilometers higher) to the fortified settlement of Staroe Kholopye. Much later, a village was built on that site. Borisogleb with the Musin-Pushkin estate. The detachment took Staroye Kholopye, went up the Udrus River, scattering through the villages up to Suminskoye, and through Novinka, Krutets, Vetryanka, closing the encirclement ring, together with the second detachment rushed through Fedorkovo to Velikoye Selo, Turbanovo, Staroe Merzleevo, and from Haleva to Pokrovskoe. This is exactly how, in my opinion, the encirclement of Prince Yuri’s troops should have happened. This “roundup” scheme does not contradict the chronicles and is confirmed by the folk legends of all these places and individual conclusions of scientists and local historians.

Now you can imagine the entire course of the Battle of Sith. Since all of Burundai’s detachments approached without haste, secretly, and their actions were coordinated in advance, there were no large time intervals between battles in different places. However, the first battle should be considered the defeat of the three thousand-strong regiment of Dorozh at night, in the morning, on March 2, 1238. It must be assumed that the attack on him was made when the main part of him was in the peasant huts of the villages of Mogilitsa, Bozhonki and others, because Prince Yuri and Dorozh had already been waiting for the attack for 8 days.

Naturally, Dorozh could not keep the regiment in the saddle for many days, having warm huts. Hundreds, or rather dozens of horsemen were guarding the western directions. Dorozh considered his rear safe. Villages with Russian soldiers were simultaneously surrounded. A mortal battle began near the huts.

Russian soldiers jumping out of huts were chopped down near doors and windows. Very few managed to escape from the encirclement. It was a brutal battle. Voivode Dorozh, who had galloped to Prince Yuri, reported: “Prince, the Tatars have already bypassed us... We were waiting for them from Bezhetsk, and they came from Koy.”

Having passed the deserted low-lying area of the mouth of the City, the Yaroslavl detachment attacked the area of the villages: Cherkasovo, Ivan-Svyatoy, Breytovo, Ostryakovka and others.

Simultaneously with the offensive from the mouth of the City, the second operational (non-Kouz) detachment of Burundai attacked the convoys in Knyaginin and Semenovsky and began to destroy their fortifications (according to legend, there was a monastery in Semenovsky). This Nekouz detachment discovered the ambush regiment even earlier and attacked it with the main forces. The ambush did not work. The reserve regiment was the first after the Dorozha regiment to take the blow when moving to the village of Semenovskoe to help. The battle was heating up. Perhaps Prince Yuri gave the command, or rather, the commander of the third regiment of the right hand himself sent some of his soldiers to help Semenovsky through the City. The battle became fierce near the village of Ignatovo (near Semenovsky).

At this time, the third (northern) encirclement detachment attacked Velikoye Selo, surrounded it and destroyed it along with its people (Velikoye Selo did not revive), and then hit the right-hand regiment in the village. Pokrovsky and began to push the soldiers from the shore onto the Ice City. From the other bank, from Knyaginino, Semenovskoye and the nearby village of Ignatovo, they also began to push Russian soldiers onto the Ice City. Prince Yuri supposedly had about 15,000 warriors, with more than half being poorly trained militias. Peasants also took part in the battle, but at best they only had pitchforks and ordinary axes.

Burundai had at least forty thousand horsemen in all the detachments participating in the Battle of Sita. He brought about two darkness to Voskresensky on the City. About one darkness was in the second (Nekouz) operational detachment and about one darkness was in the third (Yaroslavl) detachment.

The superior forces of Burundai surrounded the Russian troops in parts, compressing the encirclement ring, and by the evening of the same day they completely destroyed both regiments: the central one, led by Prince Yuri, in the Stanilovo-Yuryevskaya-Krasnoe area, and the northern regiment of the right hand, in the Semenovskoye area. Ignatovo - Pokrovskoye. Prince Yuri died in the village of Yuryevskaya.

In the Semenovskoye-Ignatovo-Pokrovskoye area, the battle broke out earlier than in Yuri’s camp itself in Stanilov, so the chroniclers may correctly claim that Yuri divided his troops, sending part to help the northern regiment, and thereby accelerated his death. Therefore, it was here that the most fierce battle could have taken place, since the entire regiment of the right hand, the reserve regiment and part of the troops of the central regiment took part in it. Here, surrounded in parts, Russian soldiers from both banks were pushed onto the ice of the City by superior forces, where so many fighters accumulated that the ice could not stand it and broke.

There is a legend about a huge number of corpses on both sides in the ice breaks; they stopped the flow of the river, forming a dam. This place began to be called “rafts”.

Burundai's army was so weakened in the Battle of Sita that this fact was one of the reasons for Batu Khan's refusal to storm Novgorod the Great with a population of thirty-five thousand.

In conclusion, we can say: at the beginning of the battle, Prince Yuri had three combat line regiments at a considerable distance from each other and a reserve (ambush) regiment; to carry out the Sita operation and completely encircle the Russian troops, Burundai divided the army into three operational detachments and three encirclement detachments; the invasion of the City by all of Burundai’s detachments was carried out covertly, in deep secrecy, all scouts, witnesses and small detachments approaching the City were destroyed.

The Battle of Sita took place in three places: in the area of the villages of Mogilitsy and Bozhonki (battle of the Dorozha regiment); in the Stanilovo - Yuryevskaya - Ignatovo - Krasnoye area (battle of the central regiment under the command of Prince Yuri); in the Semenovskoye - Ignatovo - Pokrovskoye area (here, according to assumptions, there was the most fierce battle with participation in it, in addition to the right-hand regiment of the reserve regiment and part of the central regiment sent by Yuri to help).

Stella near the village of Lopatino

monument in Nizhny Novgorod

The battle that took place on March 4, 1238 between the army of the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich and the corps of Burundai.

Prerequisites

Balance of power

After the capture of Vladimir on February 7, 1238, the main forces of the Mongols headed through and to Tver and Torzhok, and secondary forces under the command of Temnik Burundai were sent to the Volga cities - the possessions of the nephews of Yuri Konstantinovich, who withdrew their troops to the City.

The Laurentian Chronicle says that Yuri was expecting a regiment of Yaroslav's brothers in the City, who occupied Kiev in 1236, leaving his son Alexander as governor in Novgorod, and Svyatoslav, however, Yaroslav is not mentioned among the participants in the battle.

Progress of the battle

The Mongol corps under the command of Burundai, within 3 weeks after the capture of Vladimir, approached the City from Uglich.

The outcome of the stubborn battle was decided by the approach of fresh Mongol forces led by.

The Vladimir army, which did not have time to prepare for battle (with the exception of a guard of 3 thousand people under the leadership of governor Dorofey Semyonovich), was surrounded and almost completely died or was captured.

Prince Yuri died along with the army, his head was cut off and presented as a gift to Batu Khan. The Yaroslavl prince Vsevolod Konstantinovich died.

Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich and Vladimir Konstantinovich Uglichsky managed to escape.

Consequences

Our land has experienced many tragic events over its long history. One of the deepest wounds left on the body of the country is the invasion of the Mongol-Tatar army back in the thirteenth century. The Russian warriors fought back fiercely, and the nomads became even more furious. But the forces were unequal. The Battle of the Sit River in 1238 was an attempt to unite the troops of all principalities in order to repel the enemy. But this was done, alas, too late. The bitter defeat and huge losses on the part of the Russian people still had consequences: Batu's horde stopped its advance to the west, not reaching Veliky Novgorod several miles.

The Battle of the Sit River took place on March 4, 1238. On the enemy side were the tumens of Burundai, who significantly outnumbered the army of Yuri Vsevolodovich, the Vladimir prince. The Mongols were informed about the number and composition of the Russian regiments by Prince Gleb, a traitor who was expelled by almost all of his fellow tribesmen. Therefore, Batu sent approximately forty thousand of his soldiers, who, however, also almost all died in this massacre.

The Battle of the Sit River had its own background. After the capture of the city of Vladimir (February 7), Batu sent his horde through Yuryev-Polsky and Pereslavl-Zalessky to Torzhok and Tver. However, he sent part of his many thousands of troops under the command of Temnik Burundai to the possessions of the nephews of Prince Yuri Konstantinovich in Sit, where Russian warriors were gathering.

For three weeks, Burundai's corps reached the militia, covering enormous distances (during the same time, the main forces of the invaders covered half the distance). He approached the City from the direction of Uglich and attacked the Russian army, which was taken by surprise. Unprepared warriors resisted, but almost all died or were captured.

The battle on the Sit River lasted two days. The three thousandth guard regiment was the first to take the blow on the night of March 2nd. The main militia was stationed in nearby villages, so the Mongols surrounded all the villages almost simultaneously. The remnants of the squad gathered on the banks of the river, and they were pushed onto the ice from both banks. Under the weight of the armed warriors, the ice broke, and the last defenders of the fatherland fell into the cold water.

This is how the heroic battle on the Sit River ended. A map of this battle will help to more vividly imagine the events of almost eight hundred years ago. Prince Yuri, later numbered among the holy martyrs, died fighting with his soldiers. His head was separated from his body and presented as a gift. However, such a gift did not make the commander-in-chief very happy: he saw that with each city taken he was losing too many of his troops, so he thought about suspending his campaign against Russian lands.

The Battle of the Sit River is a tragic page in our history; it resulted in the principalities of northeastern Rus' becoming dependent on the Golden Horde. The completely devastated Ryazan, Murom, Vladimir, Suzdal, Kozelsk, Torzhok, and the burned surrounding villages lost not only their accumulated wealth, but also people who either fell in clashes or were driven into slavery. This defeat strengthened the Mongols in the idea that all Russian lands could be captured, so they later launched a new campaign against Kyiv, Chernigov and the Galician-Volyn lands.

Municipal educational institution

Beloselskaya secondary school

Municipal educational institution Beloselskaya secondary school

Supervisor:

a history teacher

Municipal educational institution Beloselskaya secondary school

1. Introduction 3

2. “And the slaughter of evil came…”

2.1. Why Sit? 4

2.2. Dispute about the location of the battle. Historiography of the issue. 4- 12

2.3. Physical and geographical description of the City. 12-13

2.4. Possible routes of the Mongols to Sit and the reasons for their surprise attack

to the Russian army. 13-17

2.5. The location of the Russian army and its strength. 17-20

2.6. Plans of Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich. 20-21

2.7. Battle 22-23

3. Conclusion 24

4. References 25

5. Appendix 26

1. INTRODUCTION

At the end of 1237, having captured and completely destroyed Ryazan, Kolomna and Moscow, hordes of Horde soldiers went to the throne city of Vladimir - the residence of the Grand Duke of Vladimir-Suzdal Yuri Vsevolodovich. The sad experience accumulated by that time in the defense of Russian cities, besieged by numerically superior enemy forces, led to the need to change the tactics of confronting foreign invaders, since defending in besieged wooden cities is much more difficult than in open areas. Therefore, Grand Duke Yuri, leaving his family in the city, left Vladimir at the end of 1237 in order to gather the Russian squads of North-Eastern Rus' under his banner and become a barrier to the further advance of the Tatars.

The battle took place on March 4, 1238 on the Sit River. The Russian regiments were unable to provide organized resistance, especially since the Mongol-Tatars had numerical superiority. Many Russian soldiers and the Grand Duke himself died in the battle.

It should be said that the Battle of the City still largely remains a mystery to historians. They do not have accurate information about the number of Russian and Tatar troops, about the consequences of the battle, and there is still a dispute about the location of the battle. The unresolved nature of this problem is evidenced by the fact that in memory of this battle there are currently two monuments in different regions (Yaroslavl and Tver). Using archaeological methods, the site of the battle, a very fleeting event, is very difficult to find. It was almost impossible to organize a funeral, much less build burial mounds, in those conditions, and weapons, as a rule, were the usual spoils of war for the victors. It is quite possible that some of the dead were subsequently transported to the cities for burial, some were buried on the spot, and some were left without burial. Considering that even the body of Yaroslavl Prince Vsevolod was never found, what can we say about ordinary soldiers.

Goal of the work: Based on available sources, reconstruct the events of the Battle of Sith.

To achieve this goal it is necessary to complete the following tasks:

§ study historical sources on this issue;

§ conduct an analysis of the physical and geographical features of the City to determine the most advantageous location of the Russian army;

§ identify possible routes of the Mongols to the City and the reasons for their secret attack on the Russian army;

§ put forward your version of the course of the Battle of Sith.

When getting acquainted with the battle on the river. Experts, and even ordinary history buffs, have a lot of questions. Some of them will never be answered, and historians are left with only speculation; the other part of the issues is still waiting to be resolved. The greatest likelihood of discovering new data arises during archaeological excavations, but since the collapse of the USSR, large-scale archaeological research has not been carried out. But these days, the so-called “black archeology” is flourishing, as a result of whose activities historical monuments are irretrievably destroyed, the most valuable cultural layers are violated, and with them the mystery of unraveling the mysteries of the past.

Based on chronicle sources and the works of Russian historians and local historians, we will try to consider the main issues relating to the Battle of Sita. Studying different points of view on this issue will allow you to form your own view of events. Unfortunately, practically no data on the battle has been preserved; it is limited to a few chronicle lines.

The battle did not receive proper coverage in Russian noble-bourgeois historiography. Even such a major historian as Yov devoted only 10 lines to the battle of the City. Soviet historians devoted little attention to this topic. In works on the history of military art, literally 2-3 phrases are said. So in the major work of Colonel E. Razin it is said: “On the City River... the Vladimir squads tried to resist, but were surrounded and defeated on March 4, 1238.”

The Battle of Sita was studied in most detail by a major Soviet historian. In his works he talks about the need for archaeological searches. “The city is still waiting for its researchers,” he writes.

2. “AND THE SWEAT OF EVIL WAS HAPPENED...”

2.1. WHY SIT?

Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich’s choice of the City River for a military camp was quite successful. The power provided the Russian army with a number of important advantages. The places there are remote, and dense forests protected the prince from a direct attack from the Mongol cavalry; it was not easy to get here along forest roads in winter, and he hoped to wait here for help from his brothers and northern cities. The forests covered the grand ducal camp from the flanks, and its narrow valley to some extent balanced the forces of the opponents, which was beneficial for the small Russian army. The rugged and forested terrain also facilitated, mainly on foot, Russian soldiers, to repel attacks by horse-dwellers of the steppe.

Yuri's camp, moreover, was connected by a large land road with Novgorod, covered by forests from the Mongol vanguards. The Mologs walked along the ice to the camp with sleigh tracks: from the south - from the Volga, and from the north from Beloozero. These roads ensured the arrival of reinforcements from the rich Volga and northern cities: Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Uglich, Ksnyatin, Tver, Kashin, Vologda, Veliky Ustyug, etc. Light ice roads made it possible to uninterruptedly supply the troops with food and fodder.

The military importance of the City was very significant. The threat from the north prevented Batu from disbanding his troops to “raid” the northeastern lands in small detachments, which allowed part of the Russian population to hide in the forests and flee across the Volga. The Mongols were forced to allocate up to half (or maybe more) of their troops directly against the Grand Duke, as well as for the blockade of the City area. This significantly weakened the offensive on the main Novgorod direction. For the same reason, the small city of Torzhok fought with the Horde for two weeks, having neither a squad nor a prince. As a result, the Mongols lost a lot of time and effort, and Novgorod became inaccessible to them.

2.2. DISPUTE ABOUT THE PLACE OF THE BATTLE. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ISSUE

Our chronicles did not indicate the location of the battle, and this gave rise to a dispute between historians and local historians. Some of them (academician) argued that the battle took place within the villages of Bozhenka or Mogilitsa within the Tver region. Other historians (A. Preobrazhensky, -Pushkin) considered the site of the battle to be the village of Yuryevskoye and the village. Krasnoe within the Yaroslavl region. The place of death of Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich was also controversial.

Further study of the battle on the river. The city is associated with the use of archaeological materials. Based on these materials, historians tried to clarify the location of Yuri Vsevolodovich’s camp and the site of the battle; reconstruct the course of the battle using excavation data and local toponymy; check the chronicle information about the battle. Archaeological research in the City Basin, which lasted several decades, serves as an example of how, based on approximately the same source materials, researchers come to completely opposite conclusions.

In 1846 an article was published by a colonel of the General Staff “On the art of war and the conquests of the Mongol-Tatars and Central Asian peoples under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane,” in which he wrote about the campaign of Grand Duke Yuri: “George from Vladimir should move to Tver, but, probably, the movement of the Mongols to Moscow and then sending a weak detachment of Mongols to Torzhok prevented him from following this road. And George was forced to rush along the northern routes leading from Vladimir through Uglich to Novgorod... In all likelihood, the position of the Vladimir prince was on the border of the current Tver and Yaroslavl provinces. Batu's troops, divided into detachments, after plundering the Vladimir principality, gradually moving closer to the west, through Tver and Yaroslavl so unexpectedly bypassed the flanks of Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich that the patrol sent for reconnaissance, galloping up, reported to the prince that the Tatars had bypassed him and were nearby. The Grand Duke had barely begun to establish squads when the Tatars appeared on the flank, attacked the Grand Duke’s troops and completely defeated them. To the side of the positions, about twenty versts to the north, there is the village of Mogilitsy, where legends about the great slaughter of the Russians by the Tatars on the Sit River are still preserved there. The Grand Duke and his retinue were probably thrown back there, and died there...”

1) messages from the chronicles - Laurentian, Resurrection, Novgorod, Vologda-Perm, Trinity, etc., as well as legends preserved by folk memory are ignored. They all unanimously say that the battle with the Mongols took place on the Sit River itself, and not somewhere 20 miles away from it.

2) Prince Yuri’s positions are located where there are continuous forests and vast swamps, and there are almost no villages.

The conclusion suggests itself - the colonel’s version is not supported either by knowledge of the geography of the river, or by archaeological excavations, or by agreement with sources (chronicles), i.e., scientific knowledge. Yuri Vsevolodovich needed a spacious place, with many villages, where he hoped to gather a large army.

The first of the historians to visit the Sit River was a famous scientist and academician. Wanting to establish the location of the battle, in 1848 he went to the Tver province, where, according to his information, a river flowed. He reached the village of Bozhenka, where, based on questioning the old-timers and examining mound groups, he named the area around Bozhenka in the upper reaches of the City as the site of the battle between the grand ducal regiments and the Mongols. He wrote about this: “Approaching the village, I saw several mounds. So that's where it was - an unhappy battle, or better said, defeat. Near the church itself rises a large mound, five meters high...” The local priest told Pogodin that, according to legend, the battle took place near the village of Bozhenki, and Prince Yuri was killed not far from here, near Sidorov Stream. Then the academician made an attempt to excavate a mound in the cemetery near the church, but was unsuccessful. Pogodin was satisfied with the information received from the priest: “Having found the village of Bozhenki, I seemed to lie down on my laurels and could not pay attention to anything.” Consequently, the village of Bozhenki was the first to be discovered by an academician. His authoritative word left its mark on historical literature and began a dispute about the location of the battle on the Sit River and the place of death of the Grand Duke. If Academician Pogodin had gone down the river to Yuryevsky, Krasny, Lopatin, Pokrovsky, even Breitov and collected the legends and traditions preserved there, then he would have had to think about it and not so quickly decide the question of the location of the battle and “not lie on his laurels.”

At the end of winter 1238 the entire course of the City River from the headwaters to the mouth was covered by military measures: mobilization, movement of military detachments, outposts, food and fodder convoys. During the Mongol attack, isolated skirmishes took place in many places, guards were killed, and troops and retreating troops who did not have time to approach the main battle site were killed. The few surviving local residents had the impression that the battle took place near their village. As they say, “in battle, it seems to every soldier that the main blow is directed against him. Over time, new settlers came to the deserted City, generations changed, and with them, ideas about a distant event were transformed beyond recognition. A few centuries later, most of the villages claimed the role of a “historical place”. It is impossible not to take into account local legends, but some historians paid too much attention to them, which only confused the solution to the secrets of the Battle of Sith. Oral traditions, “there were”, legends, stories are found in abundance in any ancient settlement of Russia. They are often associated with local toponymy.

Yaroslavl local historians also expressed their ideas about the place of the battle with the Mongols. A. Preobrazhensky, who examined the mounds of the City in 1853, provides interesting data about the remains of fortifications. On the left bank, about 12 versts from the village. Pokrovsky, and in the direct direction from the City River about eight versts,” he discovered low embankments, and interviewed peasants from neighboring villages indicated that “before, a small ditch was noticeable from embankment to embankment, so that the embankments with the ditch formed an oblong quadrangle.” In addition, also on the left bank of the City, “about two versts from the village of Pokrovskoye,” there was “an earthen rampart more than 15 fathoms long, up to three fathoms high and about seven fathoms at the base.” Local residents told A. Preobrazhensky about the finds in and around the shaft of “human bones and ancient weapons.” A. Preobrazhensky expressed the idea that the battle took place in the area of the villages of Pokrovskoye, Semenovskoye, and the village of Ignatovo within the Yaroslavl province. The Preobrazhensky fortifications in the northern part of the modern Sita region are very remarkable. Perhaps there was a line of fortifications here, including fences that protected the field from an attack by the Mongols from the north. The same “Ethnographic Collection” contained an article that spoke in support of A. Preobrazhensky regarding the location of the battle. He refuted the opinion, which proved that Yuri Vsevolodovich camped on the Sit River at the border of the Yaroslavl and Tver provinces and walked towards Bezhetsk. Referring to the chronicles, Nadezhdin pointed out the prince’s path to Yaroslavl, and then along the Volga and Mologa to the mouth of the Sit River, where he camped in the lower reaches. The location of the battle in the lower reaches of the river was confirmed by the fact that the body of the prince was picked up by the Rostov Bishop Kirill. After the departure of the Mongols, the bishop was returning from Beloozero, where he was hiding from the steppe inhabitants. On the way back, I stopped at Sit, found the prince’s body and brought it to Rostov. But he could only do this if the place of death was not far from the mouth of the river. The bishop could hardly reach the village of Bozhenki, which was located about 100 km from the mouth of the river. This assumption by Nadezhdin is unconvincing. The bishop, who abandoned his flock in difficult times, would be ready to go further than Bozhenok in order to at least somehow rehabilitate his cowardice. the first suggested that near the villages of Bozhenka and Mogilitsa, within the Tver province, there was only a battle between Dorozh’s advance detachment and the Mongols, which Yuri sent to “prosoki,” i.e., reconnaissance, but not a battle of the main forces. This version was quickly picked up by almost all subsequent City researchers.

In 1859 writes that burial mounds and various kinds of earthen fortifications were traced along the banks of the City from the mouth to the villages of Krasnoye and Bozhenka “with bardysh, arrows and other finds.” In the vicinity of the village of Pokrovskoye, “earth towns” that had survived at the time of his trip were noted, where “according to local legend, Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich was killed.”

Of particular value are the archaeological excavations carried out on the City in the 60s. XIX century famous Yaroslavl local historian. He examined more than 20 mounds near the village of Pokrovskoye and left a detailed description of them. According to his observations, there were no mounds in the upper reaches of the City (including in the area of the villages of Bozhenki and Mogilitsy) up to the village of Stanilovo. The first group of 10 mounds was located on the right bank of the City, not far from the village. Pokrovsky, then all the mounds were located on the left bank of the City. Of the numerous mounds of the river (up to 200), the mound group on the left bank northeast of the village of Pokrovskoye is especially interesting. Nine mounds of this group are located on a low ledge. Which he considered the remnant of the ancient settlement.

Twenty-four mounds near the village. Pokrovskoye, near the villages of Ignatovo and Merzleevo were excavated. The burials of some of the mounds were lost, the description of the finds given suffers from brevity and lack of accuracy, however, even in this form, the results of the excavations were very important. Sabaneev noted that some skeletons were found scattered, their limbs were separated even before burial (Ignatievsky Kurgan), on many skeletons “traces of bladed weapons are very clearly visible; in some, the bones were cut, in others, the skulls bore clear traces of strong breaks and cuts, and, finally, in others, rusted blades of small iron knives were found between the ribs.”

Sabaneev also confirmed the military significance of the mounds by the fact that very few things were found with the skeletons, and some of the excavated mounds “belong to the Tatars.” It should be noted that some of the burial mounds (up to 10%) had incorrect orientation, which is common during hasty burial in winter conditions. A similar phenomenon was noted during excavations of the cemetery of victims of the Mongol pogrom in Old Ryazan. In addition, Sabaneev wrote that the City mounds (excavated near the village of Pokrovsky) in terms of the nature of the burials and accompanying material are very similar to the Vladimir mounds of the time of the Mongol invasion, excavated in 1866. (the so-called “Vladimir small group”).

Based on an inspection of the area and questioning of old-timers, Sabaneev wrote that “bones and remains of weapons are still found in the fields and are washed away with water, but in the old days this happened much more often.” Sabaneev restores the picture of the battle in this form: the Tatars approached from the west, “on the Pereyaslav-Ksnyatinsky road through Kashin,” and in “the origins of the City there was only a skirmish of Dorozh’s advance detachment, and the main mass of the army, taken by surprise in the camp, fled and dotted with their corpses of the shores of the City right up to the mouth, where, while crossing the Mologa, it suffered a final defeat.” An interesting point - how could an initially fleeing and defeated army finally be defeated on Mologa? And why did the Russians have to flee along the river to the mouth, and not to the nearby and saving forest? The Mongols were faster than Russian warriors, especially on foot, and running from the Mongols along a flat ice road was like death. Sabaneev attributed the beginning of the battle to the Mikhalevsky mounds, located on the Sit River near the village of Yuryevskoye and the village. Pokrovskoe. In 1866 A famous Yaroslavl local historian spoke in print. He used the material about the battle that had accumulated by that time and entered into polemics with Academician Pogodin, Colonel Ivanin and archaeologist Gatsissky. In his speech, he called the area of Ignatovo and Yuryevskoye the site of the battle, where Prince Yuri was killed. In his opinion, in the area of the village. Bozhenki were burial mounds of Dorozh warriors. In 1881, he opposed the characterization of the Sita mounds as having “military significance.” . He believed that traces of Yuri Vsevolodovich’s camp on the City could not have been preserved at all. Since “at this time of year it is extremely inconvenient to camp, and it is absolutely impossible to make earthen trenches with the means at that time; Therefore, it seems to us more likely that there was no camp at all, and the troops were simply stationed in the villages.” Polemicizing with, he argued that the mounds of the City belonged entirely to the 10th-11th centuries, and did not have a military origin; they were filled, in the words of Ivanovsky, with “peaceful measures and all.” Ivanovsky rejects obvious facts - the results of Sabaneev’s excavations. Despite all the apparent convincingness (in total, Ivanovsky excavated about 150 mounds out of 250 available in the City), the data cannot refute the conclusions. First of all, Ivanovsky’s report does not indicate which groups of mounds were discussed; undoubtedly, among the hundreds of mounds in the City there were many earlier burials that were in the nature of a peaceful burial. A group of mounds near the village. Pokrovsky, excavated, was not mentioned at all in Ivanovsky’s report, and no reference was made to the numerous finds of weapons and skeletons by local residents in the first half of the 19th century. However, the publication of the results of Ivanovsky’s excavations led to the fact that historians stopped connecting the City mounds and the remains of earthen fortifications with the battle and subsequently tried to clarify the location of the battle and its course solely on materials of toponymy and local legends. So in 1886, based entirely on folk legends, he called the vicinity of the village of Ignatovo the site of the battle, and in 1889 - the village. Bozhenki, and his only argument was that Bozhenki had some “Batu trees” known to local peasants.

Regarding the location of the battle on the river. A Nizhny Novgorod archaeologist also appeared in print. He, following the example of his teacher, himself in the late 80s. XIX century I went to Sit, excavated a mound in the cemetery near the church in the village. Gods. Then he drove along the banks of the City to the very mouth. On the road from Bozhenki to the village of Lopatina, he excavated mounds, which, as it turned out, had nothing to do with the battle. These were the burials of the ancient inhabitants of the region - the Meryan tribes. By definition, his excavations were “purely ethnographic in nature.” He did not explore the Pokrovsky burial mounds and based his further research on “folk memory, legends and place names.” A local legend, recorded by Gatsissky, connects the battle with the outskirts of Bozhenki and “even precisely” determines the place where Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich died - on an island in a marshy swamp five miles from the village. Gods. The battle scheme developed looks like this: “The place of the battle is the vicinity of the village of Bozhenka; pursuit of the faltering Russian squads approximately to the villages of Stanilov and Yuryevsky.” He repeats the same thing in his book “On Sundovik. In Zhary. On the City, on the River,” published in 1890. In Nizhniy Novgorod.

In 1902 A book by the famous public figure of the Yaroslavl province, writer and local historian Pushkin, entitled “Essays on the Mologsky District,” was published. In it, the author described the battle on the river. Sit. He knew the river and the villages located along it well. Musin-Pushkin also collected legends from the local population about the battle. In his opinion, Prince Yuri came to the Sit River along this route: Vladimir, Rostov, Uglich, Myshkin, Nekouz, Stanilovo, where he set up his camp.

The author admits that in the area of Bozhenok and Mogilitsy there were clashes between the advanced detachments of the Mongols and the Dorozha regiment, and the battle itself took place in the Stanilov area. In this battle, according to Musin-Pushkin, the steppe inhabitants used a tactical technique called a horseshoe or round-up. It consists of simultaneously capturing the flanks with cavalry and enclosing the enemy. At the same time, a large detachment of Mongols moved along the City from Bezhetsk and Red Hill, and another - along the Volga and Mologa. The latter, in the lower reaches of the Sit River, attacked the prince’s convoys, began to rob and burn them, and kill people. To repel the Tatars, the prince divided his army into two parts and thereby accelerated his death. Near the village of Ignatovo, the battle was so fierce that the ice on the river broke, and a dam was formed from the corpses, raising the water in the river. According to legend, this shore was called “raft”. Prince Yuri died, according to Musin-Pushkin, near the village of Yuryevskoye, where his body temporarily rested under a limestone slab.

The Musin-Pushkin version is vulnerable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the researcher ignores the chronicle, which directly states that the prince went to Sit through Yaroslavl. Secondly, the Mongol attack from the mouth of the river and from the upper reaches (from the rear and front), if it had taken place, cannot be called a round-up, i.e., a complete encirclement of the enemy. Yuri's flanks were covered by huge forests and swamps, so a “round-up” in the classical sense of the word was impossible on the City. Thirdly, at the beginning of March such a small river as the Sit could hardly have broken through. It is more likely that in the spring, when the river opened up, many corpses of dead soldiers accumulated near the “dams” - hence the name. Fourthly, Yuryevskoye, like hundreds of other villages bearing this name in Rus', probably had nothing to do with the Grand Duke, and owed its name to the founder of the village.

Pre-revolutionary historians no longer dealt with the question of the location of the battle on the Sit River; in Soviet historiography, events related to the battle were not the subject of special research at all, with the exception of small articles of a local history nature.

In 1932-33. the mounds on the City were examined by a detachment of the Middle Volga archaeological expedition of the AIMC under the leadership.

The report of this detachment states that “a number of mound groups on the City River, examined in the 80s. last century by Ivanovsky, have now been destroyed by excavations, many are being plowed open.” The materials of the expedition nevertheless note that the mounds on the City near the villages of Pokrovskoye, Semenovskoye and Seminskoye and a number of mounds on the Sebli River yielded “things from the end of the 12th - beginning of the 12th century. XIII century." Unfortunately, the results of the archaeological work of this expedition are limited to this indication. The archaeological substantiation of the chronicle news of the battle on the City apparently did not attract the attention of the scientists of the Middle Volga expedition. The unsystematic nature of the excavations, the lack of a complete description of the archaeological work on the City, the conflicting opinions of historians whose arguments are almost impossible to verify, and the promotion of “national memory” as the main source of research cause difficulties in summing up the results. As the historian says: “Only new archaeological work on the City River, carried out using modern scientific methods, can clarify this issue. Meanwhile, there is almost no material of this kind.”

Since 1933 no further scientific archaeological work was carried out. Only “black archaeologists” and local “amateurs” are active, causing great damage to the cause of revealing the secrets of the Battle of Sith. Every year the field for scientific methods is increasingly shrinking. But sometimes discoveries are accidental. So in the 1960s. A local historian from Rostov, in his article “The Tragedy of the Russian Land,” mentions the discovery in the village of Ivanovskaya during excavation work of a burial in which about 30 skulls and pieces of chain mail, axes, swords and other finds were found. According to opinion, Dorozh’s detachment was sent to the area of the village of Bozhenki to stop the Mongols’ path to the Sit River from the Bezhetsky top. In the forest surrounding Bozhenki, there may have been a clearing through which the steppe inhabitants could penetrate. Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich ordered to block it. This version is probably closer to the truth, but the location of the clearing near Bozhenok is controversial. The local historian was inclined to believe that the main battle took place near the village of Yuryevskoye. In 1963, in his article “Following the footsteps of the battle with the Tatar-Mongols on the Sit River in 1238,” he wrote: “About 45-47 years ago I heard from a local priest, a very old man, that prayers were held annually in the Yuriev chapel for Prince Yuri, and this allegedly made it possible to preserve the temporary burial place of Prince Yuri to this day. Under the influence of this legend, one gets the impression that the main battle of the Russians with the Tatars in the City took place precisely in the vicinity of Yuryevsky.” Kudryavtsev also connects Dorozh’s battle with the Mongols with legend: “The reliability of the legend is also confirmed by the ritual of “commemoration of the murdered,” observed on the mounds in the recent past, in the memory of our contemporaries. The ritual was observed on March 4, that is, on the day of the Battle of the City.” Information about this ritual was received by Kudryavtsev from a Rostov local historian. There is interesting information about a certain stone with an inscription found in Yuryevskoye. “The place of his () temporary burial on the battlefield is marked by a dilapidated chapel, which contains the remains of a limestone gravestone with some kind of inscription in Slavic script. The slab is broken into several pieces, and some of them are lost. Because of this, it is difficult to determine the text of the inscription.” In general, Kudryavtsev continues the traditions of researchers of the 19th – early 20th centuries, making references to “national memory”, as well as to local historians and toponymists.

The famous writer V. Chivilikhin does not specify the location of the battle, but still believes that “in the area of the present villages of Pokrovsky, Stanilov and Yuryevsky, Yuri Vsevolodovich settled in a camp, preparing for partisan warfare - the only possibility of resistance...”

In this case, V. Chivilikhin clearly got carried away. The entire princely family was in Vladimir, and the capital was looking forward to help from Yuri Vsevolodovich; in such conditions there was no question of partisan warfare. In addition, partisanship has always been the work of the people, and not of princes or kings.

The most original version was put forward by local historian Sergei Alekseevich Ershov, a retired captain of the second rank. He believes that the Russian troops were located at the beginning of the battle along the City River, at a distance of more than 100 km, and the battle raged almost throughout this entire space. In his article, Ershov writes: “The Battle of Sita took place in three places: in the area of the villages of Mogilitsy and Bozhonki (battle of the Dorozha regiment); in the area of Stanilovo - Yuryevskoye, Ignatovo - Krasnoye (battle of the central regiment under the command of Prince Yuri); in the Semyonovskoye – Ignatovo – Pokrovskoye area. Here, according to assumptions, there was the most fierce battle with participation in it except the right-hand regiment of the reserve regiment and part of the central regiment sent by Yuri to help.”

The local historian placed a small Russian army on a vast territory, where it should have simply dissolved.

The results that can be summed up when summarizing archaeological, ethnographic and local history material boil down to the fact that there really was a big battle on the Sit River and this is confirmed by chronicle information. At the same time, the geography of finds of the remains of weapons and human bones suggests that the battle took place on the territory of the “Sit Opolie,” which is located in the middle reaches of the Sit River. The skeletons with traces of blows with cold steel and accompanying weapons discovered during excavations of mounds prove that one of the centers of the battle was the village of Pokrovskoye. Only near this village were the remains of warriors from the 13th century found in mounds. That is why one of the modern historians considers the area of the village of Pokrovsky to be the center of the battle. The Pokrovsky burial mounds, as well as the remains of a settlement with traces of fortifications, noted by A. Preobrazhensky, convincingly prove that a battle was in full swing in this area, and if not all, then a significant part of it. The only settlement found in the City near Pokrovsky stubbornly hints at the location of the grand ducal camp (or headquarters). Objections about the impossibility of building a fortified camp in winter conditions are not convincing enough, since Yuri Vsevolodovich could have used a pre-existing settlement for his camp. Also, the local population and militias could be involved in the construction of fortifications.

Almost all known finds of bones and weapons come from the villages of Pokrovskoye (mounds), Ignatovo (mounds), Ivanovskoye (30 bones), Semyonovskoye, Baylovskoye. All these villages are located on the territory of the so-called Sita Opolye. -Markov points out a stream in this field with the eloquent name “Voiskovoy”. It is difficult to give a more complete description of the Battle of the City River without the use of new archaeological materials. This would be helped by re-examining the surviving mounds, as well as the settlements, to determine which of them existed at the time of the battle. It is possible that many villages arose in subsequent centuries, introducing toponymic confusion with their names. Excavations of the site could also yield interesting results. The most promising area for archaeologists remains the “Sit opole”. In the meantime, we can say: “The power is still waiting for its researchers.”

2.3. PHYSICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY

In determining the location of the battle on the Sit River, studying the physical and geographical features of the river can help. The Sit River is small, originating in the forests, 20 km east of the Novgorod city of Bezhetsk (now in the Tver region), near the village of Saburovo. The length of the river is 153 km, the Yaroslavl region accounts for 98 km, that is, 64%. The Sit River flows in various physical and geographical conditions, which had a significant impact on the structure of its valley. Based on the terrain features, the river can be divided into three sections. The first is the upper reaches of the river. It is located in Bezhetsky Verkh, a fairly high place. Its relief is hilly and flat. Absolute height – 172-225m. One of the high points, located 6-7 km from the source of the river, is called “Hill”, its height is 225 m. The width of the river at the source is about 1 m, and only at the border, between the upper and middle sections, the width of the river becomes 10-12 m. The river is shallow. The valley is developed only in the lower part of the segment; there is a floodplain and the first terrace above the floodplain. The upper reaches of the City are cut off from the middle and lower reaches of the river by forests and swamps called Swamps. From the depths of swamps and forests, from the north, the river of the same name, Bolotya, approaches the bed of the City. Part of the swamps of the Swamp did not freeze even in winter.

The second section starts from the village of Bolshie Smenki. At 25-30 km. from its sources the Sit enters a large depression. Its length is 40 km, width – 30 m. The relief is flat, the height above sea level is 130-136m. In some places there are large hills with gentle slopes and single elongated manes. A significant part of the lowland is occupied by extensive swamps. These include Mokeikha, Solodikha, Zybinskoye and others. The river floodplain here is well developed and during a flood it is widely flooded with water. Within the lowland, the river has tributaries: Obluchye, Bolotya, Vereksa, Moshnaya, Voronovka. The Sit River from the mouth of Boloteya to the village of Filippovo flows along an artificial channel dug in the 60s. XX century Its length is 12 km. Such large-scale hydraulic engineering work is associated with the extraction of peat in the swamps of the Sita Lowland.

The third section is the lower reaches of the river. Outside the Sitskaya lowland near the village of Kolegaeva, Sit makes a sharp turn and goes strictly north. A little higher than this village it enters the moraine plain area. Its relief is hilly, the height varies between 148-182m. The river valley in this section is not wide when compared with the valleys of other Yaroslavl rivers - Ustya, Kotorosl. Its width ranges from 340-375m. The slopes of the main bank are steep, the modern floodplain and the terrace above the floodplain are poorly developed. The width of the river at Kolegaev is 26 m, Shcherbinin – 40 m, Pravdin – 40 m, Stanilova – 48 m, Nazarov – 55 m. In a number of places the river bed has a widening reaching 70-80m. In this area, 23 rivers and several streams flow into the river. Most of them (23) are left bank. In addition, the indigenous banks of the river are significantly indented by deep ravines. The river in the lower reaches is very picturesque. The valley of the middle and lower City is framed on the west and east by mighty forests, full of swamps, and to this day barely passable. The upper reaches of the river and its lower reaches were quite densely populated in the distant past. This is evidenced by the presence of a large number of mounds located on the banks of this river. The Finno-Ugric people, who inhabited this area from the 6th - 7th centuries, were buried in them. n. e. Later, the Slavs appeared here, who were attracted by the fertile lands, the abundance of animals in the forests, fish in the river, as well as the presence of a good waterway - the City, connecting the population with the largest waterway - the Volga. Small villages and villages cling to the riverbed of the City. Closer to the lower reaches, near the mouth of the left tributary of the City - the Kamenka River, the City valley pushes the forest to the sides and forms a small field of about 10 km. in diameter. The lands of Opolye, free from forests and swamps, were densely built up with settlements of local residents - Sitskars.

Sitskari are not numerous and, until recently, were famous for their carpentry and the craft of making river boats or longboats. The dialect of the Sitskars is also unique. Its features indicate the population of the City Valley as a separate group of Slavs in the East Slavic population of the upper Volga. It is unknown what tribes they came from - perhaps from the Slovenes of Novgorod or from the Krivichi of the Polotsk land (now Belarus). The upper course of the river, crossing the Bezhetsky top, belonged to the possessions of Novgorod the Great. Below the shifting massif of Bolotei, to the northeast along the City valley, there were lands that already belonged to the Vladimir-Suzdal, and later to the Uglich princes. The border between them ran along the Sita Lowland, and the Swamp separated the principalities. In this area there is a village with an eloquent name - Sheldomierz (went to the border). A small village in the 13th century may have served as a boundary mark. The village of Bozhenki adjoined the Bezhetsky region and therefore belonged to Novgorod.

Of course, I took into account that the Mongol army was cavalry, and the Russian army was mainly on foot and, moreover, small in number. To counter the cavalry, it was necessary to choose a place with rugged terrain and forested areas, so that the Mongols would be forced to fight dismounted. The only place that hampered the actions of the Horde cavalry was the lower City with its previously noted features. It was easy to build various kinds of defensive structures here, especially abatis. The local population could also be mobilized for these purposes. On the upper City, thanks to the flat terrain, the Mongols could fight on horseback and maneuver quite freely, which immediately put the small Russian army at a disadvantage. The approaching Russian militias had to be placed somewhere and organized into combat units - regiments. For this, again, the lower City with its opole and numerous villages was ideally suited. This area, moreover, did not have side roads, and the enemy could only attack from the mouth or upper reaches of the City, which facilitated the defensive tasks of the Russian army. The most convenient places to repel the onslaught of a superior enemy were sections of the river below Stanilov near the village of Yuryevskoye, where the forests came close to the City. In the north, such a place was the village. A guardhouse that blocked the field from the side of the river mouth. There was no point in extending the communications of the Russian troops any further, and it was even dangerous, since, starting from Stanilov, the troops became vulnerable to flank attacks. Analysis of the physical and geographical features of the river, as well as archaeological research, confirm the point of view of those historians who consider the lower City to be the site of the battle.

2.4. POSSIBLE ROUTES OF THE MONGOLS AND THE REASONS FOR THEIR SUDDEN ATTACK ON THE RUSSIAN ARMY

Most researchers recognize three possible directions of movement of the Mongols to the City: the first - from the upper reaches of the City, from Bezhetsk; the second - from the mouth of the City; the third is from Uglich. In this case, the routes are proposed in various variations. For example, Semyon Musin-Pushkin believed that a detachment of Mongols came to the mouth of the City from Galich along the Volga and Mologa, and to Stanilov from Bezhetsk, through Red Hill, i.e. the Horde went by two roads. Gudz-Markov speaks only about the southern route of the Mongols: “But the enemy approached from the south, from the upper reaches of the City. Hopes for forests and swamps that don’t freeze in winter have not come true.” believed that the Mongols approached the area where Russian troops were located from the west, along the Pereyaslavl-Ksnyatino road through Kashin, and then along the upper reaches of the City.

As you know, after the capture of Vladimir, the Mongols were divided into several detachments. South of the City, the main group of Mongols was busy taking the cities of Voloka-Lamsky, Tver, Torzhok, etc., where it met stubborn resistance and clearly lacked strength. This is evidenced by the two-week defense of Torzhok, not the strongest city, which, moreover, defended itself on its own without the help of Novgorod. The weakened group of Mongols was on the borders of the powerful Novgorod land and could expect a large and fresh Russian army to come out against them. Given the scattered nature of the Horde forces, the battle with the strong Novgorod army had a certain risk. In such conditions, further fragmentation of the Mongol army was impractical and even dangerous. Burundai, in accordance with steppe tactics, sought to take the Russian squad by surprise, but movement along the rough and populated road through Bezhetsk and beyond was not suitable for a sudden attack.

The Volga and Mologa, as powerful and busy routes, were also unsuitable for a sudden attack.

A rear attack from the mouth of the City is also contradicted by the fact that after the defeat the Russian soldiers retreated and fled to the north, which is confirmed by archaeological finds. A local historian put forward a bold and original version of the encirclement of Russian troops. He was born in the City, was also a military man, and his point of view is very interesting. Ershov placed the Russian regiments at a distance of more than 100 km. along the City River with security detachments along the western bank. The local historian suggests that the Mongols simultaneously reached Voskresensk, Semyonovsky and Stanilov. At the same time, Dorozh’s advanced regiment was immediately cut off and destroyed, the Russian battle formation was cut in two places, and the Yaroslavl group came to their rear, and in turn surrounded the troops of Yuri Vsevolodovich. Such an operation, perhaps, would be worthy of modern general staffs, possessing the most accurate maps and other special equipment. The encirclement of Russian troops in such a range is determined by the local historian due to the round-up tactics characteristic of the Mongols. It's hard to agree with this. As noted earlier, the Sit does not flow through the steppe, but through a huge forested and swampy region with very few roads, which in the 13th century. was less than now. In pre-Mongol times, the Russian population preferred to settle closer to navigable rivers and large lakes, since there was then a surplus of them for the small population of Rus'. The population began to move deeper into the forests and swamps later, after the intensification of the destructive raids of the steppe inhabitants. The severity of feudal exactions also began to drive farmers into remote places, where they could hide from the princely and boyar administration, at least for a while. Most villages and hamlets arose only in the 18th-19th centuries, when there was a significant increase in the population, which no longer had enough land in its usual habitats. For pre-Mongol Rus', the locations of Nekouz, Latsky and many other modern villages were unattractive due to their remoteness from rivers, and therefore from convenient roads and fisheries. When studying the events of the 13th century, one should be careful about the toponymy of the 20th. Historical science would be helped by archaeological research in the villages of the Sita Valley, which would make it possible to find out the time of their origin. In addition to dubious roads, in his work he points out small rivulets and streams for the movement of Mongol troops, which are of little use for the movement of cavalry troops. Forests, swamps, and snow could not allow Mongol troops to surround Russian troops with clockwork precision. Moreover, any accident - an ambush or an ambush - could disrupt the maneuver and even be disastrous for the Mongols. In the forest, the steppe people lost mobility; deep snow was a serious obstacle for the cavalry. In such unfavorable conditions, the division of the Horde into separate detachments over a vast territory could give a significant advantage to the Russian squads. Prince Yuri could destroy the Mongol forces piece by piece. The Grand Duke would not have chosen Sit for his camp if it was convenient for numerous flank attacks.

Burundai knew about this and therefore counted only on a sudden and massive attack of his entire corps in favorable conditions, which only the Sita opole provided.

suggests that the Mongols destroyed the guard regiment, attacked from the rear, fronts, flanks and, moreover, cut the Russian position in two places. All this, according to the local historian, happened simultaneously. But could this be? It is known that in battles, troops that did not have time to form up and deploy, as a rule, could not provide serious resistance to the enemy, especially the cavalry. The same thing happened during the encirclement and dissection of troops. At the same time, the attacking side always suffered minimal losses compared to the defending side. The chronicles speak of a fierce battle and heavy losses of the Mongols. This means that a regular counter-battle took place on the City, otherwise there would have been simply a massacre of scattered crowds of Russians.

about the Mongols’ path to the City he says: “The Mongol-Tatars began a campaign against Yuri Vsevolodovich immediately after the fall of Vladimir. At first they “chased along Yurya and the prince to Yaroslavl.” However, from Rostov the main forces of Burundai turned north, to Uglich (having apparently received more accurate information from the prisoners about the location of the grand ducal camp); on the morning of March 4, the Tatar vanguards approached the City River.”

The version is the most plausible. Indeed, after the capture of the capital of the principality, Vladimir, a large Mongol corps moved north. The steppe inhabitants quickly took Rostov, Uglich, and Yaroslavl, cutting off the eastern communications of Prince Yuri. After this, in accordance with their own tactics, the Mongols conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the City area. They soon learned that they were waiting for them in the northern direction, which meant that there would be heavy losses in the event of a frontal collision.

Yaroslavl was taken by the Mongols in mid-February, and after that Burundai did not take active action against Yuri Vsevolodovich for more than half a month. Time, apparently, was spent on reconnaissance, development of the operation and its careful preparation. In particular, the Mongol commander needed to concentrate forces in the Uglich area, hidden from the Russians. For this purpose, clearing the territory by numerous small detachments was used. The Mongols placed particular hope on disinformation. The saboteurs, under the guise of merchants, penetrated into the Russian camp, conducted reconnaissance, supplied the prince with misinformation and, at the same time, tried to sow panic in the Russian army. Intelligence provided Burundai with information about the size of the Russian army and its location. They found out the steppe people and the location of Russian patrols from Bozhenki in the south to Storozhevo in the north. From the information received, Burundai concluded that the Russians are expecting an attack from the north or south, but are not conducting reconnaissance at all from the direction of Uglich, that is, in the eastern direction. Yuri Vsevolodovich, who came to Sit along the Volga and Mologa, expected an attack from here. An ideal ice road, convenient for a large army, led along these rivers to the Russian camp. The capture of Yaroslavl was supposed to convince the Grand Duke of the correctness of his own assumptions. After conducting reconnaissance, Burundai decided to go to Sit from Uglich. This was not the most convenient road for a large cavalry army, but it promised success. Most likely, there was no permanent sleigh route there, since the small number of Sitskari maintained connections with the outside world through Bezhetsk, as well as Mologa and the Volga, where the main trade routes were located. Burundai walked towards the City, apparently where modern roads pass through Myshkin and Nekouz. This allowed him to reach the river near Stanilov, right next to the opole region, and therefore bypass the more southern Russian patrols. This path made it possible to make maximum use of the factor of surprise, and therefore guarantee victory. It must also be taken into account that this was the shortest route to the camp of the Grand Duke. From Uglich, the Mongols could also go to the City along the Korozhechna River, with an exit at the village of Voskresenskoye, but this route had a number of disadvantages. The winding Korozhechna lengthened the road and did not approach the City itself. The Mongols would have to go through the small tributaries of Korozhechna and City, which, like the forests, were covered with deep snow, as well as rubble from washed-out trees. This road took the steppe inhabitants too far from the Russian camp, which was its main drawback. When moving towards the clearing along the City, random Russian patrols could early detect the Mongols and quickly raise the alarm, which would allow the Grand Duke to cover the southern defile with the clearing in time. Burundai also took into account the fact that, due to wartime, the City turned into a relatively busy highway along which convoys, individual militia detachments moved, patrols and messengers rode, teams of hunters and fishermen wandered (the army needed to be fed). In order to maintain maximum secrecy, the Mongols needed to go to Sit as close as possible to the location of the Russian camp and, moreover, early in the morning, when traffic along the river froze, and the frozen patrols huddled closer to housing. Only the route Uglich - Stanilovo met these requirements, but not Korozhechna, nor the upper or lower reaches of the City. From Stanilov to the opole, the Mongols had a short dash left, and even if the prince had time to warn the sentries, there was no time left to block the river in the narrow forest valley near Yuryevsky. Most likely, this is exactly how events developed in the City. While moving, Burundai's large corps had to stretch out significantly and, in order to mitigate this circumstance, the Mongol commander probably chose an intermediate stop not far from the river, in the most sheltered and deserted place. All Horde forces were concentrated here under the strictest secrecy. Patrols of the most experienced warriors were sent out in all directions. Not a single passer-by should have escaped their well-aimed arrows.

Early in the morning of March 4, 1238, the well-oiled Mongol machine rushed forward. Further events were predetermined by the strategic talent of Burundai and the impeccable work of his services. Apparently, the Mongol commander did not limit his preparation for the Russian camp to the above measures. By capturing the Volga cities, Burundai completely cut off all eastern communications of Prince Yuri. Batu, having reached Tver and Torzhok, blocked the Russian army from the south, preventing Yaroslav Vsevolodovich’s regiments from approaching the City. It is quite logical to assume that the Mongols cut off the Grand Duke from the north. “Individual detachments of the Tatar cavalry went far to the north and northeast. Chroniclers report on the campaigns of Tatar troops to Galich-Mersky and even to Vologda.” As you know, the latest archaeological work carried out in Galich testifies to the capture of this city by the Mongols. In particular, scientists discovered traces of a fire in the city dating back to the time of the invasion. Until recently, most historians adhered to Tatishchev’s version, according to whom Galichz-Mersky “was not taken.” Perhaps someday archeology will shed light on the fate of Vologda. Its capture by the Mongols allowed them to prevent the approach of the Ustyuzhan, Belozersk and other northern militias, most of whom were excellent at wielding weapons due to their way of life, to the City. Agriculture in the north was not developed, and local residents were mainly engaged in trades: hunting, fishing, beekeeping, as well as campaigns against neighboring Finno-Ugric tribes for tribute. The arrival of such a “public” to Sit was undesirable for Burundai, and therefore it is logical to assume the capture of Vologda by the Mongols. It was also extremely important for the steppe inhabitants to prevent the supply of food and weapons from the north to the Russian camp. The capture of Vologda forced the Ustyuzhans and Belozersts to think about their own safety. In such a situation, the Russian army in the City found itself in a huge strategic loop.

Isolated from all his possessions, deprived of access to large reserves, Yuri Vsevolodovich found himself in an almost hopeless position. The Mongols successfully solved the problem of isolating the Russian army in the City. The Grand Duke learned about what was happening in his principality only shortly before the battle, when it was too late to change anything.

2.5. LOCATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND ITS NUMBER

Most historians and local historians are inclined to believe that the Russian army on the City was stretched along the entire river from the mouth to Bozhenki. This is usually justified by the need to quarter squads in villages. The mentioned group of researchers is characterized by the concept of a local historian, who believes that the Russian army was divided into several regiments and stood along the City at a distance of more than 100 km. He estimates the number of Russian regiments at 15 thousand people. Noteworthy is the fact that according to Ershov’s plan, while there is a right-hand regiment, there is no left-hand regiment, but an ambush regiment is indicated. This state of affairs contradicts historical information about the organization of Russian troops in the 12th-13th centuries. It is known that four years after the Battle of Sita, Alexander Nevsky used an ambush regiment on Lake Peipsi. Military historians believe that this was a new thing for the Russian army. Ershov writes: “In accordance with the tactics of the Russian troops of that time, there should also be a reserve (ambush) regiment.” The number of Russian soldiers could hardly reach 15 thousand, as Ershov says about it. The entire Vladimir-Suzdal principality could field about 22 thousand warriors and militias, but most of them died in the battle of Kolomna, during the defense of the capital (Vladimir) and many other cities. It is more likely that only a few hundred of the Grand Duke’s warriors came to the City with Yuri Vsevolodovich. His nephews (Vladimir Uglichesky, Vasilko Rostovsky, Konstantin Yaroslavsky) brought into the camp thinned squads (which even before the Mongols numbered several hundred people) and small detachments of militias. The appanage princes of small towns could bring only a tiny number of soldiers to Sit, with whom it would be unthinkable to go to the rescue of Vladimir. The princes from small towns who fled to the City did not change the picture either. So, Prince Yuri Starodubsky, when the Mongols approached, took his family and property “... beyond Gorodets, beyond the Volga, into the forests,” and he himself went to Yuri Vsevolodovich in Sit “with a small army.” Unfortunately, it is not known whether the Starodub prince managed to reach the Russian camp. The opinions of historians on this matter contradict, and the chronicles are silent. The most significant detachment was brought to the City by the brother of the Grand Duke Svyatoslav. The raid of his squad from Pereyaslavl South can be called heroic. Svyatoslav did not abandon his older brother in trouble, he covered many hundreds of kilometers, including through territory occupied by the enemy, and managed to come to the aid of Yuri Vsevolodovich. The Mongols could not prevent Svyatoslav from breaking through to Sit. Here there is a failure in the work of steppe reconnaissance. Apparently, the Mongols did not expect the daring raid of the Russian prince and simply overlooked it. A weak mobilization base forces Yuri Vsevolodovich to take peasants into his army. There was nothing to arm them with, since long-empty arsenals remained in cities that were soon captured by the enemy. The chronicles do not say anything about the participation of the Ustyuzhans with the Belozersk people in the Battle of Sita and, perhaps, this confirms indirect information about the capture of Vologda by the Mongols. In fact, Yuri Vsevolodovich could only recruit soldiers in the City, Mologa and Trans-Volga forests, mainly from peasants and tradesmen. Before the Mongol invasion, peasants were not trained in military affairs and, as a rule, did not participate in wars. Without armor and, at best, with spears, they were not the best enemy for the steppe horde armed to the teeth. Taking into account all the specified factors, it seems that the army of the Grand Duke barely exceeded 5-8 thousand people, with the warriors making up the smallest part of the total number of soldiers. There was no need to stretch such an army over a distance of more than 100 km.

Initially, Yuri Vsevolodovich’s headquarters may have been located in the village of Stanilovo, but after the squads arrived and placed them in the only convenient place - the Sitsky opole, the prince’s headquarters was moved there. Most likely, the Grand Duke used an ancient settlement discovered by A. Preobrazhensky near the village of Pokrovskoye, on the left bank of the river, to place his headquarters. It was the only fortified place found on the City. The numerous villages located in the field were quite enough to accommodate a small Russian army. Since several princes and few warriors gathered in the City, Yuri Vsevolodovich, in order to avoid quarrels, entrusted the organization of troops to an experienced commander from among his boyars, Zhiroslav Mikhailovich.

To protect the opole from an unexpected enemy attack, in the Yuryev area, where the City valley was compressed by forests, Russian soldiers probably cut down a fence, completely blocking the river and its surroundings. For the free movement of their convoys and detachments, a clearing was made through the bend of the river from Yuryevsky to Krasny, which, moreover, shortened the path. Along the clearing, there may have been cut trees to quickly block the clearing. The defile, created by nature and people, made it possible to cover the Russian position from a quick cavalry rush and made it possible to hold the enemy with relatively small forces. Unfortunately, the abatis most likely was not wide, which allowed the Mongols to quickly go around it. The clearing was probably guarded by a small detachment of soldiers, whose task was to quickly block the clearing and defend it until the main Russian forces arrived. Most chronicles testify that Yuri Vsevolodovich sent Dorozh’s detachment “to the clearings in three thousand.” However, the very word “clearings” has caused controversy among scientists. in his “Explanatory Dictionary” he explains it as intelligence. This opinion is confirmed by Sreznevsky in the “Dictionary of the Old Russian Language”. However, it is obvious that a detachment of three thousand (at least a third of the entire army) was not suitable for reconnaissance. assumed that “proseki” was the village of Proseki near Bezhetsk. It's hard to agree with this. Why should chroniclers talk about a small, unremarkable village when they could name the city of Bezhitsy, well-known at that time. In addition, sending up to a third of the army to a long distance would not be a reconnaissance, but a split of the army, with the threat of its destruction in parts by mobile detachments of the Mongols. Russian governors would not have taken such a reckless step. There were no traitors or cowards among them, so it is impossible to judge them by modern standards. Based on the indicated location of the Russian troops, it is appropriate to assume that a small detachment was stationed in Stanilov, whose task was to cover and control the abatis from the south. Separate detachments were sent to the most threatened areas. The first of them, numbering one or two hundred mounted warriors, was located in Bozhenki and Mogilitsy. He was entrusted with the duties of long-range reconnaissance in the southern direction and early warning service. A smaller detachment was not suitable for such a task, since it would be extremely vulnerable even to small steppe units. A couple of hundred Russian soldiers could easily repel the onslaught of Mongol reconnaissance (usually a hundred) and quickly retreat to the main forces before the Horde tumens approached. There was no practical sense in placing a large detachment, much less an entire regiment (Dorozha), at such a distance from the headquarters, but it would have weakened the already small main army. Russian governors and princes, who had rich combat experience, could not help but understand this.

A second detachment, larger than the southern outpost, was sent north. His tasks were more significant, since the northern direction was considered by Yuri Vsevolodovich to be the most threatening for the Russian army. The prince expected the Mongols to appear precisely from the mouth of the City, that is, from the north, where large ice routes along the Volga, Mologa and City were located. In the lower reaches of the City there still stands a village called Storozhevo. It crowns the Sita region from the north and seems to block the approaches to it from the mouth of the river. To the north, Storozhevo City becomes wider, and its valley is spread out by fields and numerous villages, since the living conditions for the population were favorable due to the proximity of trade routes. Storozhevo, with the forests and swamps adjacent to the river, was the most successful place to block the Mongols’ path to the Russian camp. So the name of this village cannot be accidental. Here, apparently, powerful abatis were created, and possibly other fortifications. The most experienced and well-armed warriors were selected for the outposts. Perhaps these circumstances prompted Burundai to conduct his operation from the east, a very inconvenient direction for the Mongol cavalry. In general, the location of the Russian army was very successful. They covered strategic directions from the north and south. Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich could easily maneuver with his own forces in a fairly wide Sita field, even in the event of an attack from the steppes from both sides. The lack of long-range reconnaissance in all directions and the lack of forces prevented the Mongols from effectively repelling them. Yuri Vsevolodovich paid little attention to the southern direction. Powerful echeloned abatis would not have allowed the Mongols to quickly roll out to the Sitskoe field and use the factor of surprise. Still, we must give the prince his due for the skillful arrangement of the Russian squads; with better knowledge of the enemy, Yuri Vsevolodovich could have successfully fought with the Horde, but, unfortunately, history did not give him such a chance. But new generations of commanders learned from the mistakes of Prince Yuri and other Russian princes, better understanding the dangerous enemy.

So in 1380, when Dmitry Ivanovich, using careful long-range reconnaissance in different directions, outplayed Mamai and Jagiello long before the Battle of Kulikovo. The steppe inhabitants did not use the experience of their predecessors, the same Burundai, and suffered a crushing defeat, despite the superiority of their forces.

2.6. PLANS OF GRAND DUKE YURI VSEVOLODOVICH

Yuri Vsevolodovich's plans changed significantly from the moment the prince left Vladimir until the start of the battle. Initially, the Grand Duke, leaving his family and almost the entire army in the capital, hoped to quickly gather new armies from the surviving lands of his principality, as well as from Novgorod, and then go to the rescue of Vladimir. The main argument for Yuri's plans were the powerful fortifications of the capital with a strong garrison, as well as abatis on the approaches to it. The prince hoped for the duration of Vladimir's defense. The guarantee of this confidence was the prince’s family left in Vladimir. At first glance, it is surprising that the prince, intending to free Vladimir from the siege, did not come to his aid for more than a month, as if he was in no hurry. The prince was in a hurry, but the collection of sufficient forces was delayed, because there were practically no more of them in the Vladimir-Suzdal land, and Yuri Vsevolodovich was looking forward to help from other lands. Indeed, could the prince go to the rescue of the capital with several thousand almost unarmed militias and peasants? In addition, people needed to be organized, trained, and armed. The Novgorodians refused to give help, hastily strengthening their city and pulling troops from their vast possessions. In such conditions, Yuri Vsevolodovich could expect help only from his brothers. The Suzdal chronicler writes: “Waiting for your brother Yaroslav from the regiment and Svyatoslav with his squad.” At the same time, the chronicler, mentioning Svyatoslav, speaks about the squad, and when mentioning Yaroslav, about the regiments, that is, about the large forces of this prince, and this is no coincidence. Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich, back in 1228, with the support of his elder brother Yuri, began to reign in Pereyaslavl South. In 1238 he managed to come to Sit to see his brother with his squad, consisting partly of Pereyaslavl residents, and mainly of Yuryevites. The city of Yuriev Polsky was the inheritance of this prince in the Vladimir land. Svyatoslav's military forces were small, but still outnumbered the squads of Prince Yuri's nephews, so Svyatoslav's arrival in the City was very important for the Grand Duke.

However, only Yaroslav Vsevolodovich could provide decisive assistance to the Russian troops in the battle. In 1238 he reigned in Kyiv, and in the north Pereyaslavl Zalessky belonged to him, and his son Alexander (the future Nevsky) reigned in Novgorod. Occupying Kyiv in 1236, Yaroslav took with him several noble Novgorodians, a hundred people from Novotorzhan, and Pereyaslav and Rostov regiments. in 1238 it was hardly inferior to the grand duke’s, and he had considerable mobilization resources. From the south he could bring his northern squads, the troops of the Kyiv land of some southern Russian princes. In addition, Yaroslav would probably have summoned his son Alexander from Novgorod, at least with his personal squad and volunteers from the Novgorod land. It is possible that on the way to the north the Smolensk regiments could join the brother of the Grand Duke of Vladimir. And wasn’t it Yaroslav who saved Smolensk from the Mongols? The chronicles say nothing about this, but the fact that the Mongols, moving south, bypassed the rich city, is suggestive. The steppe inhabitants, weakened by the campaign, could frighten the large, fresh Russian forces stationed in this city. This circumstance is indirectly confirmed by the fact that in the same 1238 Yaroslav crushed a large Lithuanian army that was trying to take Smolensk. The assistance provided to Smolensk was possibly caused by the prevailing conditions in the winter of 1238. allied relations of local princes with Yaroslav.

Having learned about the devastation of the Vladimir land, Yaroslav abandoned Kiev and hurried north, but, unfortunately, did not have time to help Yuri, because Batu’s troops were operating on the Tver-Torzhok line, and the road to Sit was cut off. It is not known how far Yaroslav advanced and where he stopped, but it was possible that it was Smolensk. Yaroslav's regiments could have decided the outcome of the battle on the City in favor of the Russian troops, but the strategy of the steppe commanders prevented such a development of events, showing their superiority. Yuri Vsevolodovich’s younger brother, Yaroslav, was an experienced and talented military leader. His life was filled with many glorious victories over Lithuania, Finns, Germans, etc. Back in 1234, he defeated German knights on the ice of the Emaegi River in the Baltic States. Perhaps here his 14-year-old son Alexander acquired valuable military experience, which would be useful to him in the future on Lake Peipus. The brothers Yuri and Yaroslav, despite the customs of those years, were connected by an ancient and sincere friendship. This is evidenced by the fact that in inter-princely strife they always supported each other and never seriously conflicted with each other. It was precisely such a comrade-in-arms that the Grand Duke needed in the difficult winter of 1238. “And I waited for my brother Yaroslav, and did not miss him,” the chronicler sadly notes. With the help of sources, you can understand Yuri Vsevolodovich’s initial plans. The situation with their transformation on the eve of the battle, when the prince learned about the current situation in his principality, is much more complicated. The chronicles do not report anything about this, and we can only make do with assumptions. Apparently, at the end of February - beginning of March, Yuri Vsevolodovich learns terrible news about the fate of his land. “The news came to Grand Duke Yuri: Vladimir was taken, and in the cathedral church the bishop and princess with their daughters-in-law and grandchildren died from fire, and your eldest son Vsevolod and his brother were killed outside the city and people were beaten, and the Tatars are coming at you. He, having heard this, cried out in a loud voice, with tears, crying for the legitimate Christian church and for the people, and for his wife, and for the children. And, sighing from the depths of his heart, he began to pray: “Alas, my God, it would be better for me to die than to live in this world.” Now why the hell am I left alone! And then the Tatars suddenly approached. He put aside his sadness...” The Laurentian Chronicle says that the prince received information about the progress of the war already on the eve of the Mongol attack. All of Yuri Vsevolodovich’s plans collapsed overnight, and he himself, apparently, fell into a state of shock. The Grand Duke found himself in a dead end situation. He could not muster enough strength. The Russian army was isolated in the City. There was nothing left to defend: cities were taken, the land was devastated, people were killed, this was the harsh reality of that time. The prince was no longer able to implement his new plans. Events developed according to the scenario of the Mongol commanders. And what could Yuri Vsevolodovich do in the current situation? There is only one thing to imagine - to meet the enemy halfway and lay down your head with honor. There was no longer any point in sitting out in the deep forests, and the prince and his warriors, having lost everything, burned with one desire - to take revenge!

2.7. BATTLE

The most common version of the Battle of Sita is the historian Markov, who believed that the Mongols attacked from the direction of Bezhetsk. In his opinion, Yuri, having received news of the enemy from Tver, Torzhok and Uglich, “sent Dorozh’s husband with three thousand soldiers to the upper reaches of the City to the swamps of the Swamps... At Bozhonka Dorozh took part in the battle with the Mongols. Many Russian soldiers fell. The surviving warriors retreated along the riverbed of the City to the village of Mogilitsy, into the very belly of the Swamp. Dorozh himself hurried to Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich with terrible news - “already, prince, the Tatars have passed us around for a day.” According to this version, the Mongols attack Dorozh from where he is going, i.e., a frontal collision occurs. Then who and where did the steppe people bypass? Then Dorozh abandons his regiment and, instead of messengers, hurries to the prince himself to report an incomprehensible detour, and many tens of kilometers away. Quote further: “This was a complete surprise for Yuri Vsevolodovich... Detachments of the Mongols began to rapidly advance along the City valley from south to north. Near some villages, the path of the Mongol horsemen was blocked by small detachments of Russian warriors. But they were unable to hold back the Mongolian cavalry and laid down their courageous heads with honor.”

The Laurentian Chronicle says: “Prince Yurya sent the road to the prosiki in three thousand men and came running, Road and speech: and oh, the prince has already passed us around the Tatars for a day. Prince Yuri heard the same thing, all on horseback, with his brother Svyatoslav and with his nephews (sons), with Vasilko Konstantinovich, and with Vsevolod, and Volodimer, and with his men, and went against the filthy ones, and the prince began to raise regiments and behold suddenly the Tatars hurried to the City against Prince Yurya, the prince put aside all his sadness and went to them, and both troops set foot, and quickly slaughtered evil, and ran before the foreigners, and then the Grand Duke Yurya Vsevolodich was killed, on the Ritsa on the City and his many warriors perished..." The chronicle says nothing about the defeat of Dorozh's regiment, but only that he came running back. It was implied that he did not personally return to the prince, but with his regiment. Dorozh as a governor personified the regiment he commanded, and for those times this was a common occurrence. The chronicles are replete with the expressions “the prince went”, “the prince took the city”, but this does not mean that he acted alone. When a prince or governor ran home with a defeated army, the chronicles said “the third himself came running,” that is, in a small number. In the chronicle, Dorozh informs the prince that “the Tatars bypassed us one day” (the word “about” in Russian means “nearby”, and it is strange that it is usually interpreted as a complete encirclement of the Russian army, but the chronicler did not specify who the Tatars bypassed - Dorozha regiment or the entire Russian army.

Another chronicle says that Dorozh (Dorofey Semyonovich) “had gone away a little, but returned again and told the river: “The Tatars have already passed us by to the prince.” These words do not contradict other sources and confirm the fact that the Russian regiment, having retreated close to the location of the troops, discovers the Mongols and returns under the threat of encirclement.

And now - a presentation of my own version of the course of the battle, based on the content of the sources. Yuri Vsevolodovich, having received information about the catastrophe that occurred with his family and the principality, as well as about the area of operations of the Tatars near Tver and Torzhok, decides to go to the last battle. The prince also receives vague news that the Mongols are already coming to him, most likely from Bezhetsk. Yuri sends a three-thousand-strong detachment of Dorozh as a vanguard up the City, the rest of the army was supposed to follow him later, since the carrying capacity of the narrow valley of the City was small. Very narrow clearings were made through the forest rubble, and even the small Russian army had to stretch for kilometers. When the Russian column passed Stanilovo, Dorozh’s soldiers discovered the forward patrols of the Mongols on the eastern bank. For the steppe inhabitants, the advance of the Russian regiment also turned out to be unexpected; this may have been facilitated by the early dark morning. Dorozh quickly assessed the threat hanging over the regiment, which could be cut off from the main forces and then destroyed. The voivode gives the command to quickly return to camp. The Mongol troops, realizing that they had been discovered, attacked the Russian soldiers stretched out on the march, and the first battles broke out. However, the main forces of the steppe inhabitants had not yet managed to reach the City, and Dorozh’s detachment managed to retreat to the main forces without great losses. received news of the appearance of the Mongols, the Russian camp was still sleeping. The soldiers were stationed in villages at great distances. Having assessed the situation, “Prince Yuri put everyone on his horse.” Quickly gathering the squads nearby - his nephews and his own - the prince moved towards the Mongols in order to meet them in the narrowest part of the City valley and prevent them from breaking out into the field. Voivode Dorozh, quickly retreating, probably did not bother to block the clearings. The prince tried to correct this mistake, but did not have time. However, the oncoming battle broke out in a narrow part of the valley, and Yuri’s squads with Dorozh’s regiment managed to hold the line in the Yuryevskoye-Krasnoye area from the onslaught of the Mongols for quite a long time. At this time, Voivode Zhiroslav gathered militia detachments stationed in the villages and prepared them for battle. The Mongols could not use their numerical superiority in this part of the City, and then Burundai sent pre-allocated units to bypass the Russian troops. The maneuver was difficult, because the steppe inhabitants had to make their way to the field through deep snow, and also through the forest. The Mongols lost a lot of time, but they no longer had a choice. Finally, Mongol troops began to reach the southern edge of the field and slowly accumulate there. At this time, Yuri Vsevolodovich and his squads were tightly bound in frontal battle. The prince sought death in battle and soon found it. Left without a leader, the Russian troops began to retreat. The Mongols, having broken out into the field, were finally able to deploy on a broad front and fully realize their numerical superiority. The Russians had one last option - to retreat to Pokrovsky, where the governor Zhiroslav Mikhailovich was gathering militia detachments. The mass of Mongols, spreading across the field, covered the flanks of the thinned squads, and individual detachments of steppe inhabitants had already infiltrated into the Russian rear. The battle began to fall apart. Some Russian detachments were cut off and tried to gain a foothold in villages, where it was easier for foot soldiers to repel the rapid attacks of mounted Mongols. On the way to Pokrovsky, almost all the princes and warriors died. This explains the obscurity of the death of the Grand Duke - there were no eyewitnesses of his death left alive. “God knows how he died, others say a lot about him,” notes the Novgorod chronicler. In the afternoon, all Mongol forces approached Pokrovsky, where militia detachments led by governor Zhiroslav were stationed. They were mainly peasants and artisans, poorly trained and armed. They could not withstand the massive attack of the Mongols for long, and soon they began to flee, fortunately the forest was nearby.

3. CONCLUSION

The Mongol-Tatar invasion can rightfully be called the first historically recorded patriotic war of the Russian people against the conquerors. And before this, Rus' had to fight with foreign invaders, but the confrontation never took on such proportions, did not cover almost the entire territory of the state and was not accompanied by such terrible casualties. Only the Patriotic Wars of 1812 and 1941-45 are comparable to those events. Unfortunately, this first patriotic war ended in defeat for our people, since the forces were too unequal. The steppe hordes, gathered in the territory from the Pacific Ocean to the Dnieper, moved to Rus'. The Horde was not opposed by a single state, a single army, with a single command, the enemy was poorly known, and therefore miscalculations were made.

Nevertheless, this war was no less glorious than other wars waged by the Russian people with their enslavers. It was also accompanied by mass heroism and selflessness. During the terrible years of the invasion, there was not a single Russian city that would surrender to the enemy, not a single Russian prince that would go to bow to the conquerors. Princes, warriors, and militias fought the horde to the last and still drank the bitter cup, and the dead, as we know, “have no shame.”

As a result of the battle, Yuri Vsevolodovich himself and his nephew Vsevolod died. The latter's brother Vasilko was captured and also then killed. Of the princes, only the third Konstantinovich, Vladimir, and Yuri’s brother Svyatoslav were able to escape. Thus, on March 4, 1238, the last hopes for successful resistance to the invaders in the Vladimir-Suzdal land were dispelled. Unfortunately, it is worth recognizing that the indecisive and not entirely logical actions of some Russian princes were not the last factor that decided the outcome of the struggle. And first of all, this concerns Yuri Vsevolodovich, who died on the banks of the City. On the other hand, the heroic struggle of the Russian people bled the Mongols dry. They will begin their next major campaign to the West only in two and a half years.

4. REFERENCES

1. GAIMK Archaeological work of the Academy on new buildings in the 1st century. M.1935.

2. About the place of the battle on the banks of the City. “Nizhny Novgorod Provincial Gazette” 1889. No. 4.

3. Gudz-Markov Rus' in the chronicles of the V-XIII centuries. Moscow, 2005.

4. “The Veil over the Battle of Sita” magazine “Rus” No. 6, 1996.

5. Overthrow of the Mongol-Tatar yoke. M.: “Enlightenment”, 1973., pp. 31-33

6. A, Essays on the history of the Yaroslavl region. Yaroslavl, 1997.

7. Lestvitsyn massacre on the City River. “Yaroslavl Provincial Gazette” 1868, No. 41.

8. By March 4, 1889, the day of honoring the memory of those killed in 1238 in the battle with the Tatars on the river. City. Tver, 1889.

9. “Travel notes of Professor Pogodin in some internal provinces” Magazine “Moskvityanin” No. 12 1848 p.113.

10. Pokrovo-Sitskaya volost. "Ethnographic collection". vol.1, 1853

11. PSRL - M, 1962, vol. 1

12. Stories from Russian chronicles. M. 1993.

13. Sabaneev mounds of Mologsky district. “Proceedings of the Yaroslavl Provincial Statistical Committee” volume V, 1868, pp. 43,76,79,89.

14. Tatishchev Russian. Vol. III. M.: AST: Ermak, 2005.

15. “Memory” M.: “Sovremennik”, 1983.

16. “The tragedy of the Russian land”, art. from the Nekouz regional newspaper “Forward” No. 11 dated February 7, 1998.

Appendix 2

Map of the Sit River showing the supposed location of the battle